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his is the third State of the Commonwealth Report produced by the 
Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University. 
The report is sponsored, in part, by ODU’s Strome College of Business. 
While the report represents the work of many people connected in various 
ways to the university, it does not constitute an official viewpoint of Old 
Dominion, its president, John R. Broderick, or the Board of Visitors.    
This report maintains the goal of stimulating thought and discussion that 
ultimately will make the Commonwealth of Virginia an even better place 
to live, work and do business. We are proud of Virginia’s many successes, 
but realize it is possible to improve our performance. To do so, we must 
have accurate and objective information about “where we are” and a sound 
understanding of the policy options open to us.  
The 2017 report is divided into six parts:
Waiting for Godot? Virginia Impatiently Anticipates the End of 
Sequestration: The Commonwealth’s lackluster economic performance in 
2016 highlights a lost decade of slow economic growth. The dependence on 
federal spending presents challenges to stimulating growth when discretionary 
federal spending is constrained by sequestration. We investigate the reasons 
for the slow pace of economic activity and ask whether new efforts to spur 
innovation and entrepreneurship are a step in the right direction.   
Virginia’s Metros: Running to Stand Still? The Commonwealth’s economy 
is the sum of its regional parts, however different they may be. After most 
regions performed poorly in 2016, there are signs that 2017 may be a more 
positive year. We delve into data on employment, jobs and taxable sales to ask 
whether the good news will last.   
The Scourge of Opioids in the Commonwealth: Opioid-related deaths have 
skyrocketed in the Commonwealth and the United States. Almost three-
quarters of those who abuse opioids start with a legitimate prescription. We 
investigate the rise of fentanyl as the primary cause of overdose fatalities 
and compare opioid practices in the United States with other industrialized 
countries. We estimate the costs of the opioid crisis and ask what steps can be 
taken to help those currently addicted and to prevent future deaths. 
Aibnb Rising: Short-Term Rentals and the “Gig Economy”: Airbnb 
offers consumers short-term rentals that increase choice and lower costs. 
Cities in the Commonwealth are struggling with the question of how to 
work with Airbnb and similar firms, and the rise of Airbnb is a challenge 
to the traditional lodging sector. We explore the emergence of Airbnb, its 
phenomenal growth, and ask how Airbnb plays a role in the larger “gig 
economy.” 
Affordability and Access in Virginia Public Higher Education: The typical 
public four-year university has increased its published tuition and fees two to 
four times as rapidly as the consumer price index. Have reductions in state 
appropriations driven these increases or are they a result of administrative 
proliferation, new amenities and the lack of firm control on tuition and fees by 
the Commonwealth? We estimate the costs and consequences.
Time to Go Regional or Mega? Interest in regional cooperation is rising 
again in the Commonwealth. We discuss the benefits of regionalism and 
examine the rise of megaregions in the United States. We ask whether there is 
a Richmond-Hampton Roads megaregion in the making.
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■WAITING FOR GODOT? 
VIRGINIA IMPATIENTLY 
ANTICIPATES THE END 
OF SEQUESTRATION 
Budget sequestration is a procedure in 
United States law that limits the size of the 
federal budget.
– Wikipedia, in a classic understatement 
insofar as Virginia is concerned  
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3A decade after the Great Recession, economic growth in the Commonwealth remains tepid. For 
six consecutive years, the real (after inflation) 
economic growth of Virginia’s economy trailed 
that of the United States. In two of these years, 
our state’s economic growth was negative, 
meaning the Virginia economy contracted. 
There has been real economic growth in 2017, 
but it once again will be less than that of the 
nation.     
The reasons for this underperformance are 
numerous: a dependence on federal spending, 
lackluster job creation among small and 
medium-sized enterprises, less than optimal 
development strategies and constraints on local 
governments. At the same time, Virginia has 
become an expensive place to pursue a public 
higher education degree, must deal with an 
opioid crisis and is burdened by several regions 
whose traditional economic bases have eroded 
substantially.  
Some disagreement exists on the condition 
of Virginia’s economy. Is our economic glass 
half full or half empty? No one believes we are 
amid an economic boom, but some point with 
enthusiasm to the Commonwealth’s job growth, 
competitive business environment, thriving 
port and attractive location as harbingers of 
a much brighter future. To others, however, 
Virginia is a state exhibiting mediocre or 
worse economic performance; suffering 
from unnecessarily burdensome taxes and 
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regulations; and experiencing an outmigration of younger workers.1 Both 
views contain kernels of truth. Reconciling these discordant views is a 
task we undertake in this chapter. 
The economic data reveal a mixture of good and bad news. Economic 
growth decelerated in 2016, but picked up in 2017. Virginia’s 
unemployment rate has fallen, its labor force has expanded and 
earnings have risen. On the other hand, our labor force participation 
rate remains low when compared to prior to the Great Recession 
– increasing numbers of people no longer are actively seeking 
employment. Job creation by small and medium-sized firms has fallen, 
raising questions about Virginia’s efforts to encourage and sustain new 
businesses.
Making sense of conflicting economic news is difficult. It is much 
easier to cherry-pick one statistic to trumpet on Twitter, cable TV or 
the internet. However, this would provide a deceptive view of what is a 
much more complicated economic situation. The task of this chapter is to 
make sense of this jumble of seemingly contradictory data.    
Disappointing 
Economic Growth Rates
Gross domestic product (GDP) is the headline measure of economic 
performance in the United States and the Commonwealth. It places a 
dollar amount on the value of all the goods and services we produce. 
While no measure of economic activity is perfect, and GDP does not 
count nonmarket activities such as barter, misses portions of the “gig 
economy” and does not place a value on household production, it is the 
most commonly used benchmark of the value of overall economic activity. 
In order not to be deceived by price inflation, however, we focus on real 
(price-adjusted) GDP.   
1   Gregory S. Schneider, “In their final debate for Va. Governor, Northam and Gillespie spar over records, 
economy, taxes.” The Washington Post (Oct. 10, 2017).
Let’s examine Graph 1. The Commonwealth’s real GDP growth in 2016 
was only 0.6 percent, well below the somewhat weak performance of the 
entire United States economy at 1.6 percent. There are, however, glimmers 
of good news in these numbers. Economic activity picked up in the second 
half of 2016 and Virginia now has had three consecutive quarters with 
growth at or above 1.5 percent. The national economy is accelerating, 
with 3.1 and 3 percent growth in the second and third quarters of 2017, 
respectively.2 The question is whether Virginia will pick up the pace or 
continue to fall behind.
Our estimate for economic growth for 2017 is 1.8 percent, which would 
represent an increase in economic activity from 2016. However, we 
will grow more slowly than our historical average and more slowly 
than the United States. If our forecasts are reasonably accurate, 
however, then this would represent the first consecutive years of real 
GDP growth above 1 percent for Virginia since 2005-2006. 
What is behind Virginia’s lethargic economic performance? An obvious 
culprit is the recent stagnation in federal government spending in Virginia. 
The federal government accounts for almost 30 percent of state GDP3 and 
therefore constant or declining federal spending is problematic. In fiscal 
year 2015 (FY 2015), Virginia was first among states in annual federal 
spending per capita ($17,502), annual per capita spending on federal 
contracts ($5,819) and annual per capita defense spending ($6,324). 
Virginia was also one of three states with annual total federal salaries and 
wages above $20 billion, the other two being Texas and California.4
2   Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Gross Domestic Product: Third 
Quarter 2017 (advance estimate).
3   The Council on State Governments (2017). “Federal Spending in the States” http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/
kc/system/files/2017_CFFR_Report_3.pdf.
4   Office of Economic Adjustment (2017). “Defense Spending by State: Fiscal Year 2015” 
www.oea.gov/resource/defense-spending-state-fiscal-year-2015.
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Graph 2 shows the decline in the total dollar volume of federal contracts 
and Department of Defense (DOD) contracts in Virginia between FY 
2008 and FY 2016. Total federal contracts in Virginia fell 7.8 percent over 
this period, from $54.8 billion in FY 2008 to $50.6 billion in FY 2016.5 
The total dollar volume of DOD contracts was down 21.1 percent over the 
same period. Not only have contract awards fallen, but also the number of 
active-duty military personnel in Virginia declined by 25.5 percent over a 
similar period – from 119,950 in September 2008 to 89,333 in June 2017.6 
At the same time DOD contract spending was stagnating, total federal 
awards declined in Virginia.7 As illustrated in Graph 3, total federal 
awards for all purposes peaked in FY 2012 and declined from FY 2013 
through FY 2015. That Virginia’s economy remained in neutral during 
most of these years should be no surprise. 
5  USAspending.gov (2017). State Summary: Virginia.
6   Defense Manpower Data Center, Military and Civilian Personnel by Service/Agency by State/County, 2017, 
www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp.
7  Total awards include contracts, other financial assistance, grants and loans.
Navy.mil
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GRAPH 3
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9Changes In Output: 
Running In Place
Before the Great Recession, which began in December 2007 and 
ended in June 2009, Virginia consistently ranked in the top half of 
states in terms of real GDP growth. Since the recession, Virginia has 
fallen behind its peers. With one exception (2015), Virginia’s economic 
performance has been in the bottom half of states since 2011.
Table 1 ranks Virginia’s real GDP growth against other states. The 
rankings do not give much reason to brag. Two states stand out as 
boom or bust: Alaska and North Dakota. When energy prices rise, the 
economies of these states grow rapidly, but falling energy prices generate 
the opposite effect. 
Why is this important for Virginia? Federal spending in the 
Commonwealth is akin to oil and natural gas for Alaska and North 
Dakota. In the first decade of the century, rapid increases in defense 
spending fueled economic growth in Virginia. In the second decade, 
declines in federal awards and active-duty DOD personnel have shifted the 
Commonwealth’s economic engine to neutral.
Not all the news is bad. Real economic growth in the first quarter of 2017 
was 2 percent,8 above that of the United States and catapulting Virginia 
into the Top 10 of states in economic growth. Whether we can sustain this 
rate of economic growth depends, in part, on whether proposed increases 
in defense spending materialize in late 2017 and into 2018.
8  2nd Quarter real GDP data for Virginia is scheduled to be released on Nov. 21, 2017.
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Defense Spending And 
Sequestration: A Closer Look
Using the word “sequestration” is almost equivalent to cursing in public 
for many Virginians. Sequestration historically referred to the forcible 
removable of assets until a debt was paid. In 2011, with the passage of the 
Budget Control Act (BCA), sequestration described a specific requirement 
for the president to reduce appropriated expenditures to the limits set by 
the BCA. While sequestration occurred only once in FY 2013, the term is 
now used to describe the BCA’s caps on national defense and nondefense 
discretionary spending. Under current law, these caps extend to FY 2025.
Attempting to forecast the outcome of the budget process in the current 
political climate is fraught with pitfalls, but we can make some useful 
observations. Congress must not only reconcile competing defense 
authorization bills, but must also come to an agreement on defense 
appropriations bills.  
Congress also is attempting to pass tax cuts, extend the debt ceiling, 
reauthorize the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), decide 
whether to act on Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and, 
most recently, discuss the Iranian nuclear deal. The legislative calendar is, 
to put it mildly, full.
Comparing the differences between the defense authorization and 
appropriations bills sheds light on the challenges facing Congress. The 
BCA cap for FY 2018 on national defense discretionary budget authority 
is $549 billion.9 The president’s budget request for national defense in the 
FY 2018 budget was $603 billion, $54 billion above the cap established 
by the BCA. The House’s version of the National Defense Authorization 
Act proposed national defense spending of $624 billion, while the Senate 
proposed spending at $640 billion. The conference agreement set the base 
national defense spending at $626.4 billion, clearly above the existing BCA 
caps.10
Turning to the appropriations process for the DOD, the president’s base 
budget request for FY 2018 was $574 billion, exceeding the DOD’s BCA’s 
caps by $52 billion. The House passed an appropriations bill in July 
2017, setting the DOD’s base budget at $584 billion. While the Senate 
had yet to move a DOD appropriations bill out of subcommittee by the 
time this report was distributed, in all likelihood, the Senate’s defense 
appropriations bill will also be in excess of the BCA caps.
Although members of the House and Senate publicly acknowledge that 
the defense spending proposals exceed the BCA caps, no action has yet 
been taken to amend or repeal the spending caps. This means that even if 
Congress were to agree to higher levels of FY 2018 defense spending, the 
president would be required to implement a sequester to lower spending to 
the FY 2018 caps. 
Using the House appropriations bill as a reference point, the president 
would be required under the BCA to order the DOD to implement 
an across-the-board 13 percent sequester, twice the amount of the 
FY 2013 sequester. To say that such a sequester would significantly 
harm the DOD’s operations is an understatement. Another round of 
sequestration would likely throw Virginia’s economy into reverse.
Given the legislative hurdles to pass the defense authorization and 
appropriations bills, there is a good chance that Congress will pass a
9   The National Defense budget function (050) consists of the DOD military (subfunction 051), defense-related 
programs in the Department of Energy (subfunction 053) and Department of Justice (subfunction 054). DOD 
activities have typically been 95 percent of the national defense budget request.
10   https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/senate-and-house-armed-services-committees-
complete-conference-on-national-defense-authorization-act-for-fiscal-year-2018.
Authorization bills create, extend or modify laws and set the amount 
of money that appropriators may spend on a specific program. 
Appropriations bills provide discretionary funding to agencies and 
programs that have been authorized. While an authorization bill may 
create or extend a new program (building a new aircraft carrier, for 
example), the program is not funded by Congress until an appropriations 
bill containing the funding is signed into law. Federal agencies may only 
spend what is appropriated by Congress.
11
new continuing resolution (CR) when the current CR expires on Dec. 
8, 2017. A CR is legislation in the form of a joint resolution passed by 
Congress to provide budget authority to federal agencies and programs 
to continue in operation until regulation appropriations acts are passed 
by Congress and signed into law. Continuing resolutions typically provide 
existing agencies and programs with budget authority based on the 
previous year’s appropriations.
Continuing resolutions usually prohibit expansion of existing programs 
and most new program starts. These resolutions typically constrain the 
ability of federal managers to address a changing environment and new 
demands for goods and services.
The impact of a CR on the DOD is not trivial. Over the last decade, the 
DOD has entered all but one fiscal year under a CR. The most recent 
delay, for example, between the start of FY 2017 and the passage of a 
defense appropriations bill was 217 days (Graph 4), a delay exceeded only 
once since 1970. 
With an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment and increasing 
demands on the military services, CRs constrain DOD flexibility and 
planning. CRs also result in the delay of maintenance programs (including 
ship repair) and reductions in training and readiness. Former DOD 
Comptroller David Norquist eloquently captured the impact of a CR 
on DOD, “The longer the CR lasts, the more damage they do. They are 
corrosive.”11
The good news for Virginia is that we expect defense spending will 
increase in 2018. While there is not much agreement in Congress, there 
appears to be an emerging consensus that the BCA caps should be 
modified (or eliminated entirely). With a modification of the BCA caps and 
passage of the authorization and appropriations bills, defense expenditures 
in Virginia would increase in the second half of 2018. Such increases would 
be welcome news and would spur increased economic growth, subject to 
the usual caveats on economic and political shocks.
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GRAPH 4
LENGTH OF CONTINUING RESOLUTION FOR DOD APPROPRIATIONS




























Sectoral Growth In Virginia
Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis suggest that the 
manufacturing sector contracted by 5.6 percent from 2015 to 2016. Graph 
5 provides the annual growth rate for manufacturing as well as the other 
major sectors of the economy.
2016 represented the sixth consecutive year of decline for the 
manufacturing industry. As a share of overall economy activity in Virginia, 
the manufacturing sector declined from 11.6 percent at the beginning of 
the century to only 8.2 percent in 2016.
Potentially troubling is the contraction in economic activity in the 
management of companies. Wages and salaries in this sector are typically 
higher than other sectors and any contraction would signal a loss of high-
paying jobs. In 2015, the sector grew almost 4 percent, so it is possible that 
2016 is an anomaly.
On a more positive note, the agricultural sector grew by almost 6.4 
percent in 2016. Utilities, information and health care, transportation and 
warehousing, and professional and business services also grew in 2016.
How has the economy of Virginia changed over time? In Graph 6, we 
compare the shares of real GDP in 2007 and 2016 for each major industry 
in the Commonwealth. Not only does this capture the relative contribution 
of each sector to overall economic activity, but also the changing 
contributions of each sector. Strong growth in professional and business 
services, health care and social assistance, and finance and insurance 
illustrate the increasing importance of these sectors to Virginia. More 
traditional sectors, to include manufacturing and wholesale trade, declined 
in importance
What about agriculture and mining? These sectors have steadily declined 
in relative importance over time, now each accounting for about 0.3 
percent of economic activity in Virginia. The mining sector continues to 
struggle with a 0.9 percent decline in 2016 on the heels of a 12.8 percent 
contraction in 2015. While mining once offered a source of good-paying 
jobs and contributed positively to economic growth in Virginia, it appears 
that this sector will continue its decline relative to other parts of the 
economy.
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GRAPH 5
VIRGINIA: 2015-2016 GROWTH IN SELECTED INDUSTRIAL SECTORS
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Labor Market Conditions
Labor market conditions generally continued to improve in 2016. Nearly 
4.4 million Virginians were in the labor force in September 2017, an 
increase of around 85,000 from the year previous (Graph 7). Not only 
were more Virginians employed or actively looking for work, but also the 
number of employed workers increased in 2017. July 2017 represented 
the largest labor force and the largest number of employed Virginians on 
record since data collection began in 1976.
More Virginians at work drove the Commonwealth’s unemployment rate 
to lows not seen since April 2008. Graph 8 displays the unemployment 
rates in Virginia and the United States and shows that the unemployment 
rate in the Commonwealth typically has been below that of the United 
States. In September 2017, the unemployment rate in Virginia was 3.7 
percent, compared to 4.2 percent for the United States. 
However, there is some cause for concern. Traditionally, Virginia’s 
unemployment rate has been about 1.5 percent below that of the nation. 
This 1.5 percent gap continued all through the 2002-2008 expansion and 
even grew during the Great Recession. However, since 2012, Virginia’s 
unemployment rate only has been about 0.7 percent lower than the 
national rate. 
Could this signal a new economic reality for Virginia? Perhaps. The era of 
hyper-partisan politics and federal budget uncertainty could mean that a 
more “natural” rate of unemployment for the state is around 3.5 percent 
instead of 3 percent. In that case, the Virginia economy may be close to 
full employment.
The data in Graphs 7 and 8 come from the Current Population Survey, 
which surveys households to find out if they are working, actively seeking 
work or not in the labor force. The U.S. Census Bureau conducts the 
survey for the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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GRAPH 7
SIZE OF THE LABOR FORCE IN VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2005 TO SEPTEMBER 2017
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GRAPH 8
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 2007 TO SEPTEMBER 2017




Unemployment Rates For Virginia and the United States, January 2007 To September 2017
 




























Whether Virginians choose to participate in the labor force influences 
the level of employment, unemployment and the overall size of the labor 
force. Virginia’s labor force participation rate typically exceeds that of the 
United States and 2017 is no exception. Almost 66 percent of Virginians 
participated in the labor force in September 2017 versus about 63 percent 
of all Americans.12
Labor force participation varies by locality. Figure 1 shows participation 
rates for 2016 were below 50 percent in many counties in southwestern 
12  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics, October 2017.
Virginia and above 70 percent in Northern Virginia, Richmond and much 
of Hampton Roads. A challenge for Virginia is to address the declines in 
manufacturing, mining and other traditional employment sectors that 
influence participation rates. A further challenge, discussed later in this 
report, is how the opioid crisis undermines labor force participation.
Here is where the rubber meets the road with regard to labor force 
participation rates. One way or another, society must support individuals 
of prime working age who for whatever reasons are not in the labor 
force. Falling labor force participation therefore constitutes an anchor 
that drags down economic growth. Hence, one way to stimulate economic 
growth in Virginia is to increase labor force participation rates.  
FIGURE 1
VIRGINIA LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE BY LOCALITY, 2016
Source: Virginia Employment Commission, Economic Information & Analytics, September 2017
Percent 
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50 - 55 
56-65 
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Virginia’s Job Performance: 
Better But Not Great
How has Virginia performed in terms of jobs? Total nonfarm payroll 
employment expanded by 58,500 jobs in 2016, a 1.5 percent increase from 
2015 (Graph 9). This was the second-highest year for job creation since 
the Great Recession and is a welcome sign after our mediocre growth in 
2013 and 2014. Job growth in the Commonwealth, however, continues to 
lag the United States.
Digging into the monthly job numbers, Virginia’s year-over-year total 
nonfarm employment growth rate exceeded that of the United States in 
2015 (Graph 10), but decelerated in the second half of 2016 and the first 
half of 2017. While job creation in the Commonwealth exceeded that of 
the United States in July and August of 2017, year-over-year growth was 
anemic in September 2017 at 0.9 percent. Virginia is underperforming the 
United States in job creation.
Graph 11 examines sector-level employment growth from 2015 to 2016. 
The health care and social assistance and leisure and hospitality industries 
led job creation in 2016, each adding 13,700 jobs when compared to 2015. 
Professional and business services also generated a significant number of 
new jobs (12,900), while the government sector added around 3,000 jobs. 
The information, mining and manufacturing sectors lost jobs in 2016.
Virginia’s share of total employment in manufacturing has declined 
every year since 1990. Compared to many neighboring states, Virginia 
has the lowest share of employment in manufacturing. Only 6 percent 
of Virginia’s jobs are in manufacturing, compared to 12 percent 
in South Carolina, 11 percent in North Carolina, 10 percent in 
Pennsylvania and 9 percent in Georgia. While Virginia has a higher 
share of manufacturing jobs than Maryland, Delaware, New York and 
New Jersey, this may not be a peg on which the Commonwealth wants 
to hang its hat.
The data in Graphs 9 and 10 come from the Current Employment 
Statistics program, which is a monthly survey of establishments on 
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GRAPH 10
YEAR-OVER-YEAR GROWTH IN JOBS: VIRGINIA AND UNITED STATES





































































































































































































VIRGINIA: CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT LEVELS BY SELECTED SECTORS, 2015-2016
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Average Weekly Earnings
Given that more Virginians are in the labor force and are employed, are 
they earning more money?13 The good news is that a Virginian’s average 
weekly earnings grew by 3.4 percent in 2016, well above the 2.6 percent 
growth for the United States (Graph 12). Virginia’s earnings growth, 
however, appears to have fallen behind the United States in 2017 and 
may end up being below 2 percent.  
The latest average weekly earnings data for August 2017 show that 
Virginia’s year-on-year average earnings growth increased by 1.9 percent 
13   We use average hourly earnings from the Current Employment Statistics program. This series measures 
wages and not total compensation. Benefits, bonuses and payroll taxes paid by employers are not included. 
As a result, average hourly earnings is not a suitable indicator of labor costs to firms.
when compared to August 2016. While this is still behind earnings growth 
in the United States, where earnings increased by 2.5 percent in the 
same period, it is higher than earlier in the year. We expect that earnings 
growth will pick up in 2018 if Virginia’s economy continues its recent 
expansionary pattern.
The economic data are discordant. Output gains are anemic and lag the 
United States. More Virginians are in the labor force, gainfully employed 
and enjoying larger paychecks. However, when Virginia is compared to 
neighboring states and the nation, its economic performance is mediocre.   
25
GRAPH 12
VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES: GROWTH IN AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS, FEBRUARY 2012 TO AUGUST 2017
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 13	
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The Dynamics Of 
Establishments In Virginia
An interesting alternative way to view the lack of dynamism in the 
Virginia economy is to focus on the number of new business establishments 
that have been created. New business creation reflects both economic 
optimism and perceived opportunities.14 It is apparent that Virginia has 
been falling short here recently. Let’s see what the data tell us.
An overwhelming number of the employed (approximately 90 percent)15 
in the United States are employed by businesses (as opposed to being self-
employed). Graph 13 displays the share of jobs for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), which accounted for 48 percent of jobs in Virginia 
and almost 50 percent of jobs in the United States.16 Virginia has tended to 
rely more on larger enterprises than the rest of the country, but this gap 
has closed dramatically since the Great Recession as the share of jobs in 
SMEs in the U.S. has declined below 50 percent. In other words, the share 
of total employment of large firms is growing in the United States and 
approaching that of Virginia. 
Graph 14 displays SME’s share of job creation in Virginia and the 
United States.17 For most of this century, Virginia’s job creation by 
SMEs has trailed the United States. Briefly, in the fourth quarter of 
2015 and the first quarter of 2016, the share of job creation by SMEs 
in Virginia exceeded the national average, but retreated in the latest 
data available.
14   There are subtle but important differences between establishments, firms and enterprises. An 
establishment is a single physical location while a firm is an establishment or a combination of 
establishments. Most businesses in the United States are single-establishment firms and the use of 
establishment data provides more precision with regard to employment. For further discussion see: www.
bls.gov/opub/mlr/2016/article/establishment-firm-or-enterprise.htm.
15   “Self-Employment in the United States,” Steven Hipple and Laurel Hammond, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
March 2016.
16  Small and medium-sized enterprises have 499 employees or fewer.
17   We examine gross job creation, which is different from net job creation. Net job creation is the difference 
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GRAPH 14
SHARE OF GROSS JOB CREATION BY SMES, 2000 Q1 TO 2016 Q2: 
4-QUARTER MOVING AVERAGE
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Not surprisingly, businesses start and fail on a regular basis. About 80 
percent of establishments in the United States with employees survive 
their first year of business, 66 percent survive a second year and 50 
percent survive until their fifth year of business. About 30 percent of 
establishments survive until their 10th year of business.18 Improving 
establishment creation and survival is a key to generating long-term 
economic development.
How is Virginia faring in fostering a climate conducive to establishment 
creation? Graph 15 displays the number of new establishments in 
Virginia from the first quarter of 2000 through the last quarter of 2016. 
On average, about 5,600 new establishments are created each quarter 
in Virginia. The pace of new establishment births declined in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession and once again in 2013 in response to 
sequestration. Births peaked in 2015 and remained above the historical 
average for most of 2016. The four-quarter moving average is also trending 
back to the historical average, suggesting slowing establishment births. If 
the focus of public policy has been on fostering new establishments, then it 
appears that Virginia has been only modestly successful in this regard.
What about establishment destruction? Graph 16 presents establishment 
deaths in Virginia for 2000 to 2016 Q1. On average, 5,054 establishments 
died per quarter over the period. As one might expect, firm deaths during 
the Great Recession spiked and there also was an increase in deaths in 
the third quarter of 2013, perhaps due to sequestration. Firm deaths rose 
above the long-term average in the first quarter of 2016, in line with our 
previous discussion that 2016 was a poor year for economic activity in the 
Commonwealth.
If the objective of economic development is to foster an environment 
conducive to the creation and sustainment of new establishments, then 
Virginia’s postrecession performance is underwhelming in most years. 
18   Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Survival of private sector establishments by opening year,” www.bls.gov/bdm/
us_age_naics_00_table7.txt.
As shown in Graph 17, net establishment creation was close to zero 
or negative in 2013 (likely due to sequestration) and uneven in 2014.  
2015 was a robust year for establishment births in the first and third 
quarters, and the first quarter of 2016 saw more births than deaths. 
Not surprisingly, the Commonwealth posted its best postrecession real 
GDP growth in 2015 when Virginians created, on average, 2,000 net new 
establishments. Since the turn of the century, the Commonwealth’s real 
GDP growth was lackluster in years when net births were negative and 
robust in years when net births were above the historical average.  
New establishments create jobs, while establishment deaths destroy 
jobs. Graph 18 illustrates the net job gain or loss from the creation 
and destruction of establishments. We can again see that when net job 
creation falls, economic activity in the Commonwealth stagnates. The 
relatively good performance of the Commonwealth in 2015 was, in 
part, driven by a large uptick in new establishment job creation. 
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GRAPH 15
NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENT BIRTHS, 2000 Q1 TO 2016 Q4
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GRAPH 17
NET ESTABLISHMENT BIRTHS IN VIRGINIA, 2000 Q1 TO 2016 Q1
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GRAPH 18
NET JOB CREATION IN VIRGINIA BY NET ESTABLISHMENT BIRTHS, 2000 Q1 TO 2016 Q1
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Business Employment Dynamics, 2017
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Small And Young Firms 
And Job Creation
We now move to examining whether small firms and young firms 
contribute to job creation in the Commonwealth. We would like the reader 
to note that our conversation is shifting from establishments to firms as 
we are beholden to the available data. While the two are invariably linked 
(many establishments are single-unit firms), there are fewer firms than 
establishments. Young firms are the ones responsible for the lion’s share of 
job creation.19 Let’s take one more dive into the numbers.
Undoubtedly, net job creation by small firms and net job creation by young 
firms are linked. Younger firms tend to be small, but there are also many 
small firms that are “long in the tooth.” Firm size is a function of efficient 
scale, so equating startups with all small firms can be misleading.
It is interesting to examine net job data by firm age rather than firm 
size. We classify young firms as those in existence for 0 to 10 years and 
mature firms as those 11-plus years in existence. Graph 19 shows that net 
job creation is highly cyclical in mature firms, much more so than young 
firms. In fact, mature firms generate far more net jobs during periods 
of economic expansion. However, young firm net job growth is far more 
stable across the business cycle. Mature firms generated more net jobs in 
the early stages of recovery from the Great Recession, but the pace of job 
creation by younger firms now exceeds that of more established firms.
How does our pace of young firm job creation compare to the nation? 
Graph 20 shows that net job creation in both Virginia and the United 
19   Haltiwanger, et al. “Who Creates Jobs? Small versus Large versus Young,” The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, May 2013.
States is highly cyclical, increasing during periods of economic expansion 
and declining during periods of slow growth or contraction. Since the 
Great Recession, however, the paths of the United States and Virginia 
have diverged. Since 2012, younger firms in the United States have 
created net jobs at a higher rate than Virginia. Simply put, Virginia 
is falling behind in the creation of new jobs by young firms. The 
sluggishness of the Virginia economy may be due, in part, to the lack of 
dynamism in small firm creation.
Is Virginia succeeding at fostering an improved climate for startups? The 
data suggest that the Commonwealth is creating an environment where 
individuals are creating more new firms than at any previous point in the 
century. Yet, the focus on firm creation may be misleading. The death rate 
of young firms in Virginia is too high and thus net job creation for smaller 
and younger firms in Virginia lags that of the nation.
We urge public officials and economic development agencies to focus 
on the sustainability of small and young firms. It is not enough to 
proclaim the number of startups as a measure of success. Reducing the 
mortality rate of these firms is important to retain the newly created 
jobs and create economic growth in the Commonwealth. Redirecting 
scarce public funds from grandiose development efforts to services that 
sustain small firms is a step in the right direction.
An establishment is a firm operating in a single physical location. A firm 
may have more than one establishment. A local “mom and pop” store 
with only one location is a single-establishment firm. A firm with multiple 
locations is a multi-establishment firm.
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GRAPH 19
YOUNG FIRM NET JOB CREATION IN VIRGINIA, 2000 Q1 TO 2016 Q3: 
4-QUARTER MOVING AVERAGE
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GRAPH 20
YOUNG FIRM NET JOB CREATION IN VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 
2000 Q1 TO 2016 Q2: 4-QUARTER MOVING AVERAGE
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Looking Ahead  
In the next year or two, the only undisputed way to supercharge 
the Virginia economy is for the federal government to end budget 
sequestration. Federal spending continues to be the most important 
determinant of the Commonwealth’s economic destiny.
In the long run, however, Virginia does control most of its own economic 
fate. We can make intelligent, focused decisions that improve the business 
climate in the Commonwealth. Improved economic infrastructure, an 
enhanced K-12 education system and targeted investments in “ed-med” 
research and development are among the most attractive strategies 
available to us.   
However, as we have just seen, providing the environment and resources 
that will encourage the creation of a larger number of new firms also 
deserves increased attention and support, as do efforts toward helping 
these budding firms survive. Alas, this would constitute a new way of 
looking at things for most cities and counties, which have tended to 
focus their economic development dollars on financial grants to selected 
private entrepreneurs who construct showpiece hotels, arenas and other 
visible structures that elected officials proudly point to as immediate 
achievements. This is despite abundant empirical evidence that the 
economic rate of return on such public investments often is impressively 
low, or even negative. 
Supporting new entrants into the marketplace represents a much less 
expensive and likely more productive use of public funds. While this is a 
long-run approach to economic development, it is more likely to lead to 
economic diversification.   
The same can be said of investments in infrastructure, K-12 education 
and “ed-med” activities. They constitute long-term strategies. Witness 
California, North Carolina and Texas in this regard. Each of these states 
now is enjoying impressive growth based substantially upon investments 
made decades previously.  
Do Virginia and its cities and counties have the vision and patience to 




We can do lots better, but we’re going to have 
to get used to doing it together.




he Virginia economy we see is the 
product of the economic activities 
of citizens and businesses across the 
Commonwealth. However, each metropolitan 
area is distinctive and therefore does not 
always perform in sync with Virginia as 
a whole. Nevertheless, from an economic 
standpoint, the state is the sum of its regional 
parts, however different from each other they 
may be. Hence, understanding the economic 
performance of specific metropolitan areas can 
provide us with insight into the challenge of 
generating consistent, broad-based economic 
growth across the entire Commonwealth. 
Unfortunately, measuring economic vitality at 
the metropolitan area level (MSA) often can be 
a perplexing task. As we have noted in previous 
State of the Commonwealth reports, the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) generates 
the national, state and MSA gross domestic 
product (GDP) estimates that we and nearly all 
other analysts use. A problem is that the BEA’s 
GDP estimates for states and regions have long 
lag times. Even though we are nearly through 
2017, the BEA’s current advance estimates for 
MSAs only include economic activity through 
2016.
This is not the only challenge. The BEA’s MSA 
estimates are updated annually and often those 
updates produce significantly revised, almost 
head-scratching estimates. For Virginia’s 
MSAs, these revisions can change economic 
growth from negative to positive. This is one 
of the reasons why we caution Virginians from 
drawing conclusions based on BEA data alone. 
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BEA estimates provide us with only one glimpse of an economic picture 
that may be much more complicated. These estimates should be used only 
as one piece of information. 
With these caveats in mind, Table 1 presents real (inflation-adjusted) 
GDP growth rates for Virginia’s metropolitan areas between 2010 and 
2016. In 2016, Virginia continued to struggle to produce economic 
growth across all its metropolitan regions. The Commonwealth’s 
largest economic region, Northern Virginia, grew at a tepid pace. Only 
one region, Richmond, stood out in terms of economic performance. 
Blacksburg, Harrisonburg, Hampton Roads, Staunton and Winchester 
each recorded significant contractions in 2016. Charlottesville, 
Lynchburg and Roanoke contracted as well, though only moderately. 
Virginia grew only 0.6 percent in 2016, so the poor regional numbers are 
not entirely surprising.
Unfortunately, even if we do take a perspective longer than a single year, 
things do not improve. While the United States’ real GDP growth rate 
between 2010 and 2016 was 2.1 percent, only Richmond approached the 
national average. Three regions – Harrisonburg, Lynchburg and Staunton 
– contracted over the period and real GDP growth was anemic in the 
remaining metro areas. Another startling fact is that Richmond was the 





REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT GROWTH RATES, 2010-2016
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
2010-2016 
CAGR1 
United States 2.5% 1.6% 2.2% 1.7% 2.6% 2.9% 1.5% 2.1%
Virginia 2.4% 0.7% 0.6% 0.0% 0.1% 2.4% 0.6% 0.7%
Blacksburg 1.2% 1.4% 7.6% -1.0% 2.2% 2.8% -2.1% 1.8%
Charlottesville 3.3% 1.0% 2.7% -0.5% 3.8% 4.5% -0.7% 1.8%
Hampton Roads -1.6% 0.3% -0.8% -0.6% -0.3% 2.8% -1.1% 0.0%
Harrisonburg 3.6% -0.9% -0.9% -0.4% -0.3% 2.5% -2.2% -0.4%
Lynchburg 2.5% -1.8% -0.9% 0.0% -0.2% -0.3% -0.5% -0.6%
Northern 
Virginia
3.8% 1.5% 0.5% -0.8% 0.5% 2.4% 1.1% 1.2%
Richmond 1.7% 0.8% 2.8% 1.3% 1.0% 3.7% 2.6% 2.0%
Roanoke -1.5% -1.0% 0.4% -0.1% -0.2% 2.3% -0.4% 0.1%
Staunton 3.0% -6.8% -7.6% 1.7% 0.8% 3.0% -2.1% -1.9%
Winchester 3.0% 1.9% 1.4% 1.4% 1.0% 2.9% -1.6% 1.2%
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Old Dominion University Center for Economic Analysis and Policy
1   The Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) is a measure of growth over multiple periods. 
While annual averages ignore the effects of compounding and can overestimate growth, 
CAGR captures the one consistent rate at which real GDP would have grown over time.
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Making sense of the MSA-level GDP data can be akin to taking a 
Rorschach test. The picture may be blurry and different individuals 
will draw very different conclusions. Because this is true, we introduce 
three additional measures to help us analyze the performance of each 
metropolitan area: (1) employment, (2) wages and (3) taxable sales. A 
major advantage of these additional variables is that each is measured 
more frequently. Employment and taxable sales are measured monthly, 
while wages are measured quarterly. Hence, they provide a better “real-
time” picture of the economic conditions in a metro area. Also, one can 
argue that these three measures are more tightly linked to metro area 
economic health than GDP.
Metropolitan Area 
Employment
Examining metropolitan area jobs and employment data provides 
conflicting signals about the state of the metro economies. While the 
employment data suggest robust growth in 2017, jobs data indicate a 
slowdown.2 To understand these different signals, let’s first discuss how 
employment and jobs are measured.
Employment data come from a monthly survey of households and are more 
sensitive to recent changes in employment, as individuals tend to disclose 
immediately whether they are employed or not. Employment data also 
capture whether individuals are self-employed or engaged in short-term 
employment, such as driving for Uber, working through Thumbtack or 
laboring in other parts of the emerging “gig economy.”
On the other hand, the jobs data come from a monthly survey of 
employers. Unlike the employment data (which count people), the jobs 
data count, as one might suspect, jobs. Therefore, if a person holds 
multiple jobs with multiple employers, each employer will report the 
2   The Current Population Survey (CPS) covers households and asks whether an individual was employed or 
actively seeking employment. The Current Employment Survey (CES) covers businesses and reports the 
number of jobs. An individual who is employed with two jobs would be counted once in the CPS and twice in 
the CES. The U.S. Census Bureau conducts the CPS for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The BLS conducts the 
CES.
individual is working for them. The jobs data can thus significantly 
outpace the employment data if people are working multiple jobs.3 Both 
measures provide valuable information about the state of the economy. 
Thus, while the terms “jobs” and “employment” might mean the same 
thing to a noneconomist, to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (and therefore 
to economists) they have different meanings. They are measured in 
different ways and thus yield different information. 
Are more people employed in Virginia’s metropolitan areas? Graph 1 
shows that employment growth was higher in each of the Commonwealth’s 
metro areas between January and August 2017 when compared to 2016. 
This is good news, as more people are reporting that they are gainfully 
employed compared to the previous year.
In Virginia’s three largest metropolitan areas, employment growth was 
highest in Northern Virginia, followed by Richmond and then Hampton 
Roads. Hampton Roads experienced positive employment growth in 2016 
despite the BEA reporting that real GDP growth in that region was 
negative. As a consequence, it should not surprise us if the BEA revises its 
GDP estimate for Hampton Roads upward (more on this later). 
Other metropolitan areas showed strong employment growth, with 
Charlottesville reporting 3 percent growth in 2017. The positive, and in 
some cases strong, employment growth suggests that economic activity 
picked up in 2017 inside several of Virginia’s metro areas.
 
3   This occurs because the jobs data would count each of the jobs separately, while the employment data would 
only count the same individual once.
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GRAPH 1
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN AREAS, 2016 AND 2017 YEAR-TO-DATE 
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Are there more jobs in Virginia’s metropolitan areas? The data here 
paint a different picture. Recall from chapter 1 that job growth for the 
Commonwealth slowed from 2 percent in 2015 to 1.6 percent in 2016 to 1.5 
percent in 2017. Graph 2 compares 2016 metro area job growth with 2017 
year-to-date job growth. 
Year-to-date job growth in 2017 has slowed in each of Virginia’s large 
metropolitan areas when compared to 2016. While Northern Virginia and 
Richmond continued to add jobs, albeit at a slower pace, job growth stalled 
in Hampton Roads. Because these three metro areas contain 73 percent 
of all jobs in the Commonwealth, slow job growth regionally translated 
into slow growth for the state.
There is, however, some good news. Job growth in 2017 for Harrisonburg 
has remained well above the state average even though it slowed from 
2016. Blacksburg, Charlottesville, Lynchburg and Roanoke all saw signs of 
stronger job growth in 2017.
Graph 3 presents employment and jobs growth in Virginia’s metro areas 
between January and September 2017. One can immediately see that 
depending on one source of labor market data could result in strikingly 
different conclusions. In Hampton Roads, for example, employment is up 
1.2 percent, yet the number of jobs is stagnant. 
The Richmond and Northern Virginia metropolitan areas also exhibit 
large differences in the employment and jobs data. Employment in 
Northern Virginia increased by 2.7 percent while jobs grew by 1.7 percent. 
Richmond also reported employment growth of 2.7 percent, and jobs 
there increased 1.6 percent. Charlottesville saw robust employment and 
job growth with 3 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively. In Harrisonburg, 
the employment and job growth were the same at 2.6 percent. We can 
conclude that jobs and employment are growing in many of Virginia’s 
metro areas but nevertheless one should avoid relying solely upon one 
measure of the labor market over another.
Nevertheless, can we explain why there are such large differences between 
jobs and employment data in several of Virginia’s metropolitan areas? 
One possible explanation is the impact of the Great Recession. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Great Recession, the number of part-time 
jobs soared as individuals took on additional jobs. Nationally, part-time 
employment peaked in January 2010 at 20.1 percent of all jobs. The ratio 
of part-time to full-time jobs in September 2017 was 17.9 percent, still 
above the average ratio prior to the recession.4 In areas with a larger 
federal government presence (Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia), 
sequestration also undoubtedly played a role. As these two metro 
economies continue to recover, it seems likely that they have experienced 
slower part-time job growth relative to full-time jobs, and this has caused 
their job growth to lag their employment growth.
Another explanation is the emergence of the contract or “gig economy.” 
More Americans are employed as contractors than at any previous point 
in history, with some estimates suggesting that more than 40 percent 
of American workers have contingent jobs.5 Rapidly increasing levels of 
self-employment (whether by choice or not) would be reflected in the 
employment data, but not in the jobs data. Large urban metro areas are 
common locations for freelancers (though there is some recent evidence 
that more freelancers are choosing smaller metros and rural areas). 
Driving for Uber or selling your wares on Etsy are two illustrations 
of these phenomena. Neither of these “gigs” would show up in the jobs 
data, but the individuals occupying these jobs would consider themselves 
employed and answer when surveyed.
As contract work and freelance work become more prevalent, 
accurately measuring employment and jobs will become more 
complicated. These discordant measures do not mean that we should 
throw our hands up and quit in frustration. If anything, the data 
illustrate the need to dive deeper into the numbers to understand the 
underpinnings of economic activity in Virginia. Relying on one measure 
may be useful for Twitter or cable television, but not for economic 
policy.
4   Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table A-9, Employment Situation Summary.
5   Elaine Pofeldt, “Shocker: 40% of workers now have contingent jobs, says U.S. Government,” Forbes (May 25, 
2015).
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GRAPH 2
YEAR-TO-DATE JOB GROWTH, 2016 AND 2017










































VIRGINIA’S METRO AREAS: EMPLOYMENT AND JOBS, 2017 (YEAR TO DATE)







































2017 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT
46 VIRGINIA’S METROS: RUNNING TO STAND STILL?■
Metro Area Wages
Politicians of all stripes promise that their policies will improve wages. 
However, one problem is that wage growth can be measured in different 
ways, and wages, much like metropolitan area GDP, are measured 
with a considerable time lag. 2017 is almost over and the most recent 
metropolitan area wage data are for the first quarter of 2017. We present 
three measures of wage growth for Virginia’s metro areas in Table 2. As 
with our discussion in the previous section, we dive into the numbers to 
see if any consistent pattern emerges across Virginia’s metro areas.
Column 1 presents what is commonly referred to as year-over-year wage 
growth. This measure represents an annual growth rate calculated by 
comparing wages in the first quarter of 2017 with wages in the first
TABLE 2
WAGE GROWTH IN VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN AREAS
(1) (2) (3)





United States 6.6% 1.3% 2.1%
Virginia 6.8% 1.1% 1.5%
Blacksburg 6.3% 1.2% 1.4%
Charlottesville 11.6% 0.6% 2.3%
Hampton Roads 5.3% 0.6% 1.8%
Harrisonburg 4.5% 0.0% 1.5%




Richmond 8.6% 1.0% 1.6%
Roanoke 4.5% 1.6% 2.0%
Winchester 7.5% 1.8% 1.8%
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Virginia Employment Commission, QCEW Wages. CAGR is the 
Compound Annual Growth Rate.
quarter of 2016. Charlottesville stands out with double-digit wage growth. 
The other metros also experienced wage growth according to this measure. 
Column 2 displays the growth in wages from 2015 to 2016, while column 
3 presents the growth rate in wages between 2012 and 2016. The picture 
here is one of slowing wage growth across most metro areas. Wages, for 
example, grew only 0.6 percent in 2016 in Hampton Roads, slower than 
the growth rate from 2012 to 2016. Only Lynchburg and Winchester 
maintained average wage growth in 2016. The story that emerges is that 
wages grew faster earlier in the decade and growth slowed in 2016.
The conclusions from this data set are mixed and perhaps a bit confusing. 
The data in column 1 suggest a labor market that is tightening and wages 
that are growing above the recent rate, but the other columns suggest 
something different. Cautious optimism is the order of the day, given the 
rather disappointing numbers for some metro areas in 2017 Q1 and the 
slower rate of wage growth in 2016 when compared to 2012-2016. 
To further confound, there is an alternative source of wage data – the 
survey of employers – that provides yet another scenario. These data paint 
a solid picture of wage growth in the metropolitan areas through August 
2017 (see Graph 4). All metro areas, except Blacksburg, experienced wage 
growth through August 2017 when compared to the same period from 
2016. Moreover, the growth rates in all but three metro areas (Blacksburg, 
Roanoke and Northern Virginia) outpaced existing inflation. The other 
six metro areas of the state saw real wage growth during the first eight 
months of 2017. Good news indeed.
How you interpret these data depends on where you stand. A pessimist 
might argue that wage growth is not only slowing, but has turned 
negative in some metropolitan areas. An optimist would point to 
double-digit wage growth and trumpet the progress Virginia is making. 
The truth lies somewhere in the middle. Wages appear to be rising in 
most of the metro areas, but wage growth slowed in 2017, which is 
alarming as wages should be rising as we approach full employment. If 
wage growth is slowing, this is indeed disconcerting, as many metros 
are approaching what typically has been considered full employment.
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GRAPH 4
METRO AREA WAGE GROWTH IN 2017 (YEAR TO DATE)
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Taxable Sales
Another viable measure of economic activity is taxable sales. More than 
two-thirds of the total spending in the U.S. economy comes in the form 
of consumption. Taxable sales capture most of this activity, though it is 
important to note that not all conventional sales are taxable and numerous 
economic exchanges go unrecorded.
Consumption levels in Virginia have increased each year since 2009. 
Residents of the Commonwealth consumed approximately $42,000 of goods 
and services per person in 2016, up from $40,000 in 2015.6 Unfortunately, 
we do not have recent data on consumption spending within Virginia’s 
metropolitan areas. Instead, we have data on taxable sales within metros, 
but as noted, this measure will miss some forms of consumption spending.  
Taxable sales growth predictably rises during business cycle expansions 
and falls during business cycle contractions. However, taxable sales growth 
at the metropolitan level usually leads the business cycle, and this makes it 
a valuable leading indicator of future economic conditions. 
At the time of publication, data were only available for the metropolitan 
areas through August 2017. Taxable sales data are highly seasonal and 
so it is important when comparing across time to ensure that the time 
periods are consistent. Table 3 presents taxable sales growth rates for 
data through August of each year. Columns 1 through 4 show growth 
rates for 2014-2017 through August of each year. Column 5 shows the 
average annual growth rate for the prerecession period 2004-2007 as a 
comparison.
Two things stand out. First, taxable sales growth between 2014 and 2017 
was positive, suggesting a growing economy. Second, though taxable 
sales grew each year between 2014 and 2017, the growth rates lagged the 
average annual taxable sales growth during the prerecession period. So, 
the metropolitan areas experienced taxable sales growth the past four 
years, but that growth was slower than they experienced prior to the 
recession.
6  Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Consumption Expenditures by States, October 2017.
TABLE 3
METRO AREA AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH IN TAXABLE SALES 
(THROUGH AUGUST OF EACH YEAR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




Blacksburg 4.2% 1.6% 1.9% 0.9% 5.9%
Charlottesville 6.4% 3.2% 6.3% 2.6% 5.4%
Harrisonburg 4.6% 2.3% 5.7% 4.1% 4.7%
Lynchburg 6.6% 1.8% 3.2% 1.3% 6.4%
Richmond 5.5% 4.4% 0.9% 4.5% 6.4%
Roanoke 4.7% 3.0% 0.2% 1.9% 4.4%
Hampton 
Roads
1.8% 3.7% 1.8% 2.9% 5.1%
Winchester 3.9% 2.5% 5.2% 4.6% 4.0%
Northern 
Virginia
-0.5% 4.6% 2.6% 2.9% 4.1%
Source: Center for Economic and Policy Studies, Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service, University of 
Virginia
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Is GO Virginia Going 
Anywhere?
Lawmakers and other regional leaders have had a marked change in 
heart with regard to economic development policy in recent years. They 
have been taking a much more aggressive and proactive stance. Virginia’s 
lawmakers approved two new initiatives during the 2016-17 General 
Assembly session – GO Virginia and the Virginia Research Investment 
Fund (VRIF). Both programs aim to create high-wage jobs in industries 
of strength. Another goal of both programs is collaboration. The lack 
of regional cooperation and collaboration is frequently mentioned as an 
inhibiting factor to growth. 
GO Virginia incentivizes collaboration by providing state funds for 
initiatives that have at least two separate localities participating. The 
program organizes Virginia into nine regions, each with a regional council 
that scores proposals submitted from business, academia, localities and 
regional organizations. The first round of proposals was not yet submitted 
at the time of publication, so we are unable to comment on benefits that 
may accrue to the regions. However, the process of regional collaboration 
is likely to stimulate beneficial economic activity with or without funding 
through GO Virginia.
VRIF is designed to stimulate commercialization of research conducted 
at universities. The program provides state funds and bonding authority 
to renovate, purchase or build research labs and research equipment. 
The final budget bill in the 2017 General Assembly session designated 
$4 million for VRIF in FY 2017 and $8 million in FY 2018 as well as 
$29 million in bonding authority.7 A small amount for the task at hand.
We believe that both programs address a critical weakness in the Virginia 
economy at present – innovation. Innovation is at the core of modern-
day economic development. Innovation enhances productivity, creates 
value and increases wages. Innovation is not just about entrepreneurship, 
however. It is important for existing companies as well. It helps those 
7   State Council of Higher Education for Virginia, Virginia Research Investment Fund, http://www.schev.edu/
index/institutional/grants/va-research-investment-fund.
firms increase productivity and tap new markets. Innovation is also at the 
core of establishment creation. We are hopeful but must await further 
funding and the results of actual projects to make firm statements about 
the benefits of GO Virginia and VRIF.
VIRGINIA INITIATIVE FOR 
GROWTH & 
OPPORTUNITY 
IN' EACH ,REUs,oN 
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Concluding Remarks
If one were to view the regional metropolitan economies as the pistons 
that drive the economic growth engine in Virginia, then it is clear from 
an economic perspective that not all the pistons are firing at the same 
time and with the same strength. The problem is that we cannot point 
to one malady for the stops and starts of the regional economies in the 
Commonwealth. Sequestration and the caps on defense spending have 
hindered federal spending in Hampton Roads. The declining importance of 
mining and forestry has hurt southwestern Virginia. The textile industry 
has almost disappeared in Southside Virginia. Meanwhile, Richmond has 
accelerated modestly ahead of the Commonwealth’s other regions.
There are strands of good news even amid the pinging and stalling of 
the economic engine. Both employment and jobs are up in most of the 
metropolitan areas, though their growth appears to have tapered off in 
2017. Wage data suggest a tightening labor market and this could boost 
wages throughout 2017. Taxable sales continue to grow in most metro 
areas but, as with the labor market, growth appears to be declining in 
2017. Not only is economic growth in Virginia overall stuck in neutral, 
there is also a distinct possibility that many metro areas may be shifting 
into reverse.
GO Virginia is a step in the right direction, but a small step. The 
amount of funding for GO Virginia is too small relative to the task 
at hand. Further, rather than spending scarce public funds upon low-
likelihood attempts to woo large employers, or heavily subsidizing private 
development, or investing in large, economically unproductive showcase 
projects, Virginia should invest in projects that spur innovation and 
in the commercialization of products and technology coming from its 
federal laboratories and universities. Attention also should be devoted to 
providing incentives that might bolster the Commonwealth’s below-the-
national-average rate of new business formation. 
If GO Virginia truly spurs regional cooperation, then the Commonwealth 
should seriously consider large increases in GO Virginia funding to 
encourage regional economic growth. This assumes that the regional 
projects put forward have sound economic bases rather than representing 
predictable grabs at what some may view as a proverbial Christmas tree 
full of presents.  
What does the future hold? Virginia’s regional economies, except 
for Richmond, appear to be decelerating. While increased federal 
spending may be on the horizon, political uncertainty may push such 
increases well into 2018. We believe that concerted political action 
to alleviate burdensome regulations, promote long-term investment 
and improve regional cooperation is needed now. This is hardly a new 
recommendation, but one we need to repeat until the Commonwealth 




THE SCOURGE OF 
OPIOIDS IN THE 
COMMONWEALTH
So consider the amount of standard daily 
doses of opioids consumed in Japan. And 
then double it. And then double it again. 
And then double it again. And then double it 
again. And then double it a fifth time. That 
would make Japan No. 2 in the world, behind 
the United States.
–  Kevin Humphreys, Professor of Psychiatry 
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Narcan to counter the effects of the apparent opioid overdose and then 
arrested the grandmother and driver for child endangerment. The young 
child now lives with distant relatives in another state. We don’t know 
what opioids were used nor do we know if the adults in the car have found 
the right treatment to combat their addiction. What is becoming clear, 
however, is that opioids are wreaking havoc on communities, and children 
are especially vulnerable.   
Unfortunately, events like this are increasingly common and raise 
troubling questions. Were the opioids prescribed or obtained illegally? 
What happens to children whose parents or guardians fall into the grips of 
opioid abuse or addiction? What are the financial consequences of illegal 
opioid use?
Often, there are more questions than answers when opioid addiction is 
the subject of discussion. One thing that we do know for certain, however, 
is that the misuse and abuse of opioids have led to a crisis that has left a 
destructive imprint on the Commonwealth and the United States. Graph 
1 illustrates the disheartening growth in drug overdose deaths in Virginia. 
The number of opioid-related deaths has almost doubled over the last 
decade. Opioid overdose was not only the leading cause of accidental 
death in Virginia in 2016, but also responsible for an increasing number of 
emergency calls and hospitalizations. In this chapter, we outline this crisis 
and suggest a plan of action.
Source: Alice Park, “The Story Behind the Viral Photo of an Opioid 
Overdose,” Time (Jan. 24, 2017)
55
GRAPH 1
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF DEATHS DUE TO ALL DRUG OVERDOSES: 
VIRGINIA, 2007-2016
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Opioids: A Primer
Opioids can be natural substances that reduce pain, such as opium or 
morphine, both of which come from poppy plants. They also can be 
synthesized from opium and morphine into other forms, such as heroin. 
Opioids, as well, can be manufactured into a wide variety of legitimate 
products that either are prescribed by physicians, or can be purchased 
over the counter.
As is true for common and legitimate drugs, opioids come in five major 
forms: tablets, capsules, nasal sprays, patches and liquids. The key 
ingredients of most opioids used in the United States come either from 
South America or Mexico. Even though perhaps 90 percent of the world’s 
heroin is cultivated in Afghanistan, only about 4 percent of heroin in the 
U.S. came from Afghanistan in 2013.1  
Synthetic opioids such as oxycodone (OxyContin), hydromorphone 
(Dilaudid) and hydrocodone (Tussionex) are made by changing the 
chemical structure of naturally occurring opioids.2 The starting point, 
however, is a naturally occurring opioid such as opium or morphine.
Table 1 reports the most common opioid varieties. 
Fentanyl, an opioid that is 50 to 100 times more potent than morphine, 
offers dramatic pain relief but is also causing an increasing number 
of opioid deaths in the Commonwealth and the United States. Like 
most opioids, fentanyl has legitimate uses. It is used to combat pain during 
surgeries and fentanyl patches provide localized pain relief. It also can 
be taken by means of a nasal spray or injection. Used recreationally and 
abusively, however, it can be fatal.  
In the summer of 2016, an increasing number of overdoses and deaths 
appeared related to a derivative of fentanyl, Carfentanil. Carfentanil is 
typically used to sedate large animals, such as elephants and rhinoceroses. 
While fentanyl is up to 100 times more potent than morphine, 
Carfentanil is up to 10,000 times more potent than morphine. What 
1   “The Drug Addiction Pipeline: Who Supplies Drugs to America?” The Recovery Village, https://www.
therecoveryvillage.com/drug-addiction/who-supplies-drugs-america.
2   CAMH: Centre for Addiction and Mental Health. www.camh.ca/en/hospital/health_information/a_z_mental_
health_and_addiction_information/oxycontin/Pages/opioids_dyk.aspx.
makes this drug so dangerous is that it typically appears as a dry, white 
powder, is hard to detect when mixed with other illicit drugs, and even 
a very small dose (0.6 milligrams) is fatal. To put this into perspective, 
the U.S. government only authorized production of 10 grams a year 
of Carfentanil versus 1,750 kilograms of fentanyl in 2017.3 From 
October 2016 to June 2017, Customs and Border Protection seized almost 
2 kilograms of the drug, illustrating the stark difference between legal 
production and illegal importation.4
Consistent opioid use, even when prescribed legitimately by a physician, 
can lead to physical dependence. As dependence increases, individuals 
may find themselves less willing or able to work and participate in society. 
Habitual use or abuse of opioids such as heroin and fentanyl may result 
in unintended death. While the withdrawal from opioids is generally not 
fatal, there are substantial physical and financial costs involved in the 
treatment of opioid addiction. 
TABLE 1
THE MOST COMMON OPIOIDS
Methadone






Demerol (pethidine) Duragesic (fentanyl)
Source: Opioids, National Institute on Drug Abuse, www.drugabuse.gov
3  https://s3.amazonaws.com/public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2016-23988.pdf.




Deaths attributable to opioid misuse or abuse have been rising rapidly. 
In Virginia, 1,138 people died from an opioid overdose in 2016, a 40 
percent rise from the 811 opioid overdose deaths in 2015.5  
By no means is this solely a Virginia problem. Nationwide, opioids were 
directly responsible for the deaths of 53,000 people in 2016, almost 15,000 
more than in 2015.6 Graph 2 illustrates the rapid growth in overdose 
deaths involving opioids between 2000 and 2016 in the United States. 
Fentanyl-related deaths in the U.S. grew by 540 percent over the past 
three years and are expected to increase again in 2017. 
Physicians wrote more than 320 million opioid prescriptions to over 
61 million Americans in 2016.7 Opioid deaths frequently begin with a 
legitimate prescription from a physician that was intended to reduce a 
patient’s pain. Four out of five heroin abusers started their opioid use 
with a legitimate prescription received from a physician.8 Even so, only 27 
percent of those taking opioids today are using their own prescription; the 
majority obtain their supply of opioids from other sources. A recent report 
issued by the surgeon general of the United States estimated that more 
5   Virginia Department of Health, Medical Examiner, Forensic Epidemiology, http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/
medical-examiner/forensic-epidemiology.
6   Centers for Disease Control, National Center for Health Statistics, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/health_
policy/monthly-drug-overdose-death-estimates.pdf.
7   CDC National Center for Injury Prevention and Control. 2017. Annual Surveillance Report of Drug-Related 
Risks and Outcomes, United States.https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pubs/2017-cdc-drug-surveillance-
report.pdf.
8  Marc Siegel, “Opioids Shouldn’t Be a Doctor’s First Resort,” The Wall Street Journal (March 28, 2017).
than 27 million Americans used illegal drugs or violated the terms of their 
prescription in 2015.9 These are grim statistics.
An International Perspective
There is no way to sugarcoat the numbers. Fueled primarily by overly 
permissive opioid prescription practices, Americans use far more opioids 
than the citizens of any other nation. Graph 3 compares the average daily 
consumption of opioids per 1 million inhabitants from 2013 to 2015 for a 
selection of developed countries. Americans consumed 138 percent more 
opioids than Canadians, 394 percent more than residents of the United 
Kingdom, 631 percent more than Italians and 3,890 percent more than 
residents of Japan.
Why does the United States (and Canada) stand out for legitimate opioid 
usage? Compared to other industrialized nations, there appears to be a 
lower regulatory burden with regards to the prescription and dispensation 
of prescription opioids for medical issues. Nonmedical uses of opioids are 
also significantly higher. Finally, opioid prescriptions are typically covered 
by health insurance, unlike many other industrialized countries.10 
While opioid use is merely problematic in countries such as Sweden 
and Spain, it is reaching catastrophic proportions in the United States. 
Clearly, the dynamics of opioid possession and use are different in the 
United States than in other developing countries. We stand out like in the 
proverbial sore thumb.
 9  Addiction in America. Surgeon General’s Report. Department of Health and Human Services (2016).
10   Benedikt Fischer, Annette Keates, Gerhad Buhringer, Jens Reimer and Jurgen Rehm. 2014. Non-medical use 
of prescription opioids and prescription opioid-related harms: why so markedly higher in North American 
compared to the rest of the world? Society for the Study of Addiction (109) 2, 177-181.
Monica Beaudry, the 23-year old daughter of a retired Hampton Roads 
naval officer, died from a heroin overdose in December 2016. She 
became addicted, tried rehabilitation programs, but ultimately was 
unable to overcome her addiction. Her story is discouragingly typical.  
See Scott Daugherty, “Forever Changed: Family Wants Justice 
for Daughter Who Overdosed 9 Months After Trying Heroin,” The 
Virginian-Pilot (May 18, 2016).   
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GRAPH 2
OPIOID OVERDOSE DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999-2016












Natural and Semisynthetic Opioids (oxycodone, hydrocodone)
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GRAPH 3
ESTIMATED AVERAGE CONSUMPTION OF OPIOIDS, 2013-2015: 
DAILY DOSES PER 1 MILLION INHABITANTS




Estimated Average Consumption of Opioids, 2013-2015 
Daily Doses per 1 Million Inhabitants 
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When Is Opioid Use Illegal?
Opioids typically are prescribed by licensed medical practitioners to 
individuals who complain of acute or chronic pain resulting from disease, 
surgery or injury. Opioids also are prescribed to people with moderate to 
severe coughs and diarrhea.  
Methadone and buprenorphine are “substitute” opioids prescribed to 
treat addiction to other opioids, such as heroin or oxycodone. Addicts are 
provided with a consistent, legal supply of these drug substitutes, with the 
aim of gradually weaning them off an uncontrolled opioid such as heroin. 
Success in this regard has been mixed.
The use of prescription opioids for anything other than their medical 
purpose is illegal. Much attention is given to the abuse of illegal opioid 
drugs such as heroin, but the reality is that some of the most commonly 
abused opioids are prescription drugs, including fentanyl, Tylenol 
containing codeine, hydromorphone (Dilaudid), oxycodone (OxyContin, 
Percocet and Percodan) and morphine.11
Opioids are sold legally under many different brand names, including 
those just listed. At the same time, they exist under different street names. 
Some of the well-known brand and street names for opioids are listed in 
Table 2.
In many American cities, identifiable illicit street markets exist where 
opioids are bought and sold.12 The flourishing nature of these illegal 
opioid street markets means not only that they constitute a major source 
of income for some participants, but also that they are responsible for 
individuals abandoning searches for legitimate employment. Frequently, 
one of the sources of the illegal opioid supply is multiple prescriptions that 
individuals have obtained from multiple physicians.
On occasion, unethical doctors operate “pill mills”13 and write substantial 
numbers of prescriptions either to addicts or to middlemen who sell them 
to drug dealers. Illegal opioids also are purchased on the “dark web” 
11   Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), www.camh.ca/en/hospital/health_information/a_z_mental_
health_and_addiction_information/oxycontin/Pages/opioids_dyk.aspx.
12   Harriet Ryan et al., “How black-market OxyContin spurred a town’s descent into crime, addiction and 
heartbreak,” Los Angeles Times (July 10, 2016).    
13    David Armstrong, “Illegal Street Drugs, Not Prescriptions, Now Powering Opioid Abuse, Study Finds,” 
published on Aug. 25, 2016, www.statnews.com/2016/08/25/fentanyl-street-drugs-cdc.
with cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin, which renders the transactions 
financially untraceable. Recent charges against two men in China 
illustrate the linkages between illicit international production of opioids 
and the shipment of opioids through Canada for distribution throughout 
the United States.14 Ironically, opioids often are shipped inside this country 
via the U.S. Postal Service.15
TABLE 2
 COMMON STREET AND BRAND NAMES OF OPIOIDS















































Source: Opioids and Morphine Derivatives, Foundation for a Drug Free World, www.drugfreeworld.org
14   Pete Williams, “Two Chinese nationals charged with selling Fentanyl to U.S. Suppliers,” NBC News (Oct. 17, 
2017).
15  http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/the-threat-to-public-safety-in-the-u-s-mail/.
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The Medical Consequences 
Of Opioid Use 
Opioid abuse often has devastating consequences. To the surprise of some, 
during the past decade, even while the death rates associated with heart 
disease and cancer declined substantially, the death rate associated with 
opioid pain medication sharply increased. 
Opioid abuse and addiction nearly always have negative mental and 
physical effects, including nausea, vomiting, a weakened immune system, 
slower breathing rates, comas, increased risk of HIV, infectious diseases, 
hepatitis, hallucinations, collapsed veins and clogged blood vessels, and 
choking.16 Unfortunately, symptoms associated with the withdrawal from 
opioids can be almost as terrifying. When someone who is addicted to 
opioids stops using the drugs, they likely will exhibit severe withdrawal 
symptoms, including anxiety, sweating, insomnia, agitation, tremors, 
muscle aches, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea and extreme mental and physical 
discomfort. These symptoms typically last four to 10 days, although 
methadone withdrawal may last longer. Generally, opioid withdrawal is 
not medically dangerous or life threatening, though some symptoms can 
persist for months.17 
The cure is not worse than the disease in the case of opioids; however, 
Baldini et al. (2012) found that even positive, well-intentioned opioid 
therapy can adversely affect respiratory, gastrointestinal, musculoskeletal, 
cardiovascular, immune, endocrine and central nervous systems.18 Further, 
the higher the daily dose of a prescribed opioid, the higher the risk of 
overdose and accompanying problems, such as fractures, addiction, 
intestinal blockages and sedation. Hence, physicians and patients must 
weigh the full spectrum of medical risks against a realistic assessment 
of observed benefits related to pain reduction. It is not clear that some 
physicians understand this responsibility fully.
16   Opioid (Opiates) Abuse and Addiction, http://www.healthline.com/health/opioids-and-related-
disorders#overview1.
17   Substance Abuse and Mental Health Service Administration. (2010). Protracted Withdrawal. https://store.
samhsa.gov/shin/content/SMA10-4554/SMA10-4554.pdf.
18   Angee Baldini, et al., A Review of Potential Adverse Effects of Long-Term Opioid Therapy. The Primary Care 
Companion for CNS Disorders, 2012, doi:10.4088/pcc.11m01326.
It is possible to reverse the immediate deadly impact of an opioid 
overdose. Naloxone (also known as Narcan) is a drug that can be used 
to treat narcotic overdoses in emergency situations. Since Nov. 21, 2016, 
when Gov. Terry McAuliffe announced that State Health Commissioner 
Marissa J. Levine declared the Virginia opioid addiction crisis a Public 
Health Emergency,19 naloxone has been much easier to obtain in the 
Commonwealth. Amazingly, it can restore breathing to a comatose, 
headed-for-death individual within two to eight minutes after being 
administered. Now, a wide variety of individuals, including families and 
friends of abusers, can obtain naloxone without a prescription and have it 
ready when needed.20 While naloxone addresses the results of opioid abuse 
and not the causes, its greater availability is a positive step forward that 
undoubtedly will save lives.   
A Closer Look At Virginia
Virginia looks reasonably good when compared to other states on drug 
overdose death rates. Graph 4 presents data describing overall drug 
overdose death rates for a selection of states in 2016. Virginia’s rate is 
below the national average and below that of neighboring states (not all 
states reported comparable data).  
Graph 5 shows that since 2010, the number of total opioid overdose deaths 
has more than doubled in Virginia. We need, however, to look deeper 
into the numbers. Figure 1 presents information on the fatal overdose 
death rate by locality for 2016. Total opioid overdose deaths are higher in 
southwestern, northern and coastal Virginia. 
19   Office of the Governor, “Opioid Addiction Crisis Declared a Public Health Emergency in Virginia,” Nov. 21, 
2016.
20   There is now a standing order in Virginia that serves as a prescription for all Virginians to obtain naloxone. 
Virginia residents can directly request naloxone from a pharmacy without first having to visit their medical 
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GRAPH 5
TOTAL OPIOID OVERDOSE DEATHS IN VIRGINIA, 2007-2016
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FIGURE 1
RATE OF ALL OPIOID OVERDOSES BY LOCALITY OF OVERDOSE, 2016
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The Virginia Department of Health reported that prescription opioid 
overdoses fell by 6.2 percent from 2011 to 2016.21 Figure 2 depicts 
the fatal prescription overdose death rate by localities in Virginia for 
2016. There may be a correlation between the number of individuals on 
Medicare and Medicaid in Virginia counties and the abuse of prescription 
opioids. Southwest Virginia appears to bear a disproportionate burden. 
A recent estimate suggested that, for 2013, over 40 percent of Medicaid 
spending in southwest Virginia health districts on emergency room and 
inpatient hospital services was related to opioid abuse.22
If prescription overdose deaths fell slightly from 2011 to 2016, what is 
driving the increase in overall opioid overdose deaths? Much like in the 
United States, the recent emergence of fentanyl and fentanyl-heroin 
combinations has led to the startling increase in deaths.
We first turn to heroin. From 2007 to 2011, heroin overdose deaths in 
the Commonwealth were relatively stable, even declining sharply in 2010. 
Since 2010, however, heroin deaths have steadily increased and were 
often attributed as the primary cause of opioid overdose fatality until the 
emergence of fentanyl. Since 2007, heroin overdose deaths increased 348 
percent, and 31 percent from 2015 to 2016. Figure 3 illustrates that heroin 
overdoses appear to be concentrated in Northern Virginia, Richmond 
and Hampton Roads. From an economic perspective, illicit drug markets 
flourish in more population-dense areas, leading to higher rates of illicit 
drug overdose in these urban areas.
Graph 7 indicates the sharp rise in fentanyl-related overdose deaths 
in Virginia and Figure 4 shows the distribution of deaths throughout 
the Commonwealth. From 2007 to 2012, the number of fentanyl deaths 
was relatively stable. Since 2012, however, fentanyl deaths in the 
Commonwealth have increased by 1,140 percent, including a 176 
percent increase from 2015 to 2016. The number of fentanyl deaths is 
expected to increase in Virginia in 2017.23
21    Virginia Department of Health. Opioid Addiction Indicators. 
22    VCU Health, VCU School of Medicine. “The Opioid Crisis Among Virginia Medicaid Beneficiaries” (January 
2016).
23   Virginia Department of Health, Medical Examiner. Fatal Drug Overdose Quarterly Report. October 2017.
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FIGURE 2
RATE OF FATAL PRESCRIPTION OPIOID (EXCLUDING FENTANYL) OVERDOSES BY LOCALITY OF OVERDOSE, 2016
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GRAPH 6
HEROIN OVERDOSE DEATHS IN VIRGINIA, 2007-2016
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FIGURE 3
RATE OF FATAL HEROIN OVERDOSES BY LOCALITY OF OVERDOSE, 2016
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GRAPH 7
FENTANYL-RELATED DEATHS IN VIRGINIA, 2007-2016
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FIGURE 4
RATE OF FATAL FENTANYL (RX, ILLICIT AND ANALOG) OVERDOSES BY LOCALITY OF OVERDOSE, 2016
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There is more to the story. The cost of opioid addiction and abuse to 
Virginia is not just measured in the number of overdose deaths. A locality 
may not have any opioid overdose deaths in a given year but may incur 
significant expenses responding to nonfatal opioid overdoses. Emergency 
Medical Services (EMS) units respond to opioid overdose calls and, 
in many cases, administer naloxone (Narcan) to counter the effects 
of an overdose. Graph 8 illustrates the 481 percent rise in naloxone 
administrations by EMS personnel from 2011 to 2016 for Virginia.
The administration of naloxone does not come without cost. While it is 
a generic drug produced by multiple companies, the price has steadily 
increased over the last five years.24 The cost of a naloxone kit ranges from 
$40 to $200, depending on the number and strength of doses. Newer 
auto-injectors of naloxone have also become available, with significantly 
higher prices, ranging from about $300 to over $3,750 per auto-injector. 
The range of possible methods of injecting naloxone makes it difficult 
to estimate the cost, but clearly the cost is likely in the hundreds of 
thousands (if not millions) of dollars, especially if one factors in the cost 
of the drugs, training, and first responder and emergency personnel time. 
If one includes the cost to families, the economic consequences associated 
with the administration of naloxone are stark.
Even more troubling is that newer opioid combinations require more than 
one dose of naloxone. First responders and families are now recommended 
to have multiple doses of naloxone on hand and, in the case of fentanyl-
related overdoes, to be prepared to administer these doses. The increasing 
potency of opioids not only increases the likelihood of an unintended 
overdose, but also the cost to localities and families to save lives.25




Another impact of the opioid crisis is on Emergency Departments (ED) 
throughout Virginia. An ED is also known as an Accident & Emergency 
department (A&E), Emergency Room (ER) or Emergency Ward (EW). 
As the number of overdoses has increased, the number of ED visits for 
treatment has increased, straining scarce resources. As shown in Table 
3, visits for heroin overdoses increased by 75 percent from 2015 to 2016. 
Non-heroin related overdoses increased by 18 percent for the same 
period.26
TABLE 3
EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT VISITS FOR HEROIN AND 
OPIOID OVERDOSE, 2015 AND 2016
2015 2016
Heroin Overdose 800 1,401
Opioid Overdose 7,534 8,710
Source: Virginia Department of Health, Opioid Addiction Indicators, 2017
26   The data represent visits by Virginia residents to emergency departments for unintentional overdose. Visits 
for opioid overdose include visits where the drug causing the overdose was not determined at the time of 
the patient’s arrival at the hospital.
“I could feel his pulse coming back slowly, and then it jumped. I’ve seen 
firsthand what a miracle this stuff is. I’ve seen people wake up that I didn’t 
think would wake up. I took a class to learn how to use it, and the class 
was only half an hour. Half an hour to save someone’s life. I think it’s very 
important.” – Bob DeTriquet, director of Male Programs at The McShin 
Foundation in Richmond, on the ease of the administration of naloxone. 
(“Free classes on administering lifesaving drug: ‘I could feel his pulse 
come back slowly,’ ” WTVR, July 20, 2017)
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GRAPH 8
NALOXONE (NARCAN) ADMINISTRATIONS BY EMS PERSONNEL IN VIRGINIA, 2011-2016
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Opiate Addiction And 
Employment
Prima facie, opiate misuse or abuse is antithetical to regular, productive 
employment. Even so, because the U.S. economy has now expanded for 
more than eight years consecutively, rising opioid use has coincided with 
rising total employment and falling rates of unemployment. This does not 
imply that drug use reduces unemployment; as we have seen, the opposite 
is true. What it does mean is that overall economic prosperity sometimes 
disguises the relationship between opioid use and unemployment rates.
A statistic that is more relevant to measuring the possible effects 
of opioid usage on work activity is the labor force participation rate 
(LFPR). LFPRs measure whether individuals of prime working age are 
either employed or looking for a job. The relevance of LFPRs to opioid 
usage is straightforward: the consensus is that opioid addiction causes 
individuals to drop out of the labor force by making them less ambitious, 
more lackadaisical and even unresponsive to ordinary labor market 
incentives.  
It is also true that unemployment rates can be deceptive because an 
individual who drops out of the labor force and stops looking for a job is 
not counted as unemployed. LFPRs, however, catch this.
The labor force participation rate in the United States for adults 25-54 
years old has been on the decline for many years and reached a near 40-
year low in May 2015 (see Graph 9). As of September 2016, 11.4 million 
men between the ages of 25 and 54 were not in the labor force.  
Does the decline in labor force participation reflect increasing opioid 
usage? Recent work conducted by Alan Krueger of Princeton University, 
under the aegis of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, strongly suggests 
that this may be so.27 Krueger found that 44 percent of men not in the 
27   Alan B. Krueger, “Where Have All the Workers Gone?” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper 
(Oct. 16, 2016). Also, Katherine M. Keyes et al., “Understanding the Rural-Urban Differences in Nonmedical 
Prescription Opioid Use and Abuse in the United States,” American Journal of Public Health (February 
2014), www.ajph.aphapublications.org. For nontechnical presentations, see Yoki Noguchi, “Opioid Abuse 
Takes a Toll on Workers and Their Employers,” National Public Radio (Jan. 20, 2016), www.npr.org, and 
Patrick Gillespie, “The Opioid Crisis Is Draining America of Workers,” CNNMoney (July 27, 2017), www.
money.cnn.com.
labor force said they took painkillers daily and two-thirds of that 
subset were on prescription medicines. By contrast, just 20 percent of 
employed men and 19 percent of unemployed men (but looking for work) 
in the same age group reported taking any painkillers (see Graph 10). 
Krueger’s empirical work led him to estimate that about 20 percent of 
the decline in labor force participation rates in the United States can be 
attributed to opioid use and abuse.  
If, for whatever reason, many people of prime working age are not 
working, then how do they survive? Some successfully claim disability. 
Social Security provided disability insurance payments to 8.8 million 
beneficiaries in 2016, up from 5.5 million beneficiaries in 2002.28  
An increasing proportion of people who have left the labor force 
cobble together a combination of sources of support that may include 
disability payments, extended family support, as well as charitable gifts, 
unemployment insurance, food stamps and perhaps some criminal activity. 
They may end up standing on a proverbial street corner, or lounging in a 
park – but not in the labor force except on a part-time, temporary or “gig” 
basis.  
What is the cost of such behavior to the Virginia economy? This is not 
easy to measure. If, however, labor force participation rate data in 
Virginia have declined 3 percent due to opioid addiction, then the 
Commonwealth has experienced between $4.5 billion and $7.6 billion in 
lost productivity.29 To put it another way, the lost productivity is at least 
equal to 1 percent of the Commonwealth’s gross domestic product for 
2017 and may be as high as 1.7 percent.
28   Social Security Administration, Office of the Chief Actuary (2017). https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/dibStat.
html.
29   In August 2017, Virginia’s labor force numbered 4.33 million individuals. If 3 percent (129,900) of those 
workers left the labor force, then our estimate of lost productivity is equal to $35,000*129,900 or $4.55 
billion annually. If we use average weekly wages from the 1st quarter of 2016 ($1,129), then our estimate 
jumps to $7.63 billion. We obtain data on gross domestic product from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
and data on the labor force from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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GRAPH 9
MONTHLY LABOR PARTICIPATION RATE FOR ADULTS, 25-54 YEARS:  
UNITED STATES, 1997-2017
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GRAPH 10
PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE WHO TOOK PAINKILLERS THE DAY BEFORE, 2010-2013  
(BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS)
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Opiate Addiction And Crime
Does opioid abuse or addiction lead to additional crime? The National 
Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence argues that “drugs and 
crime are directly and highly correlated and serious drug use can amplify 
and perpetuate preexisting criminal activity.”30 Evidence concerning this 
is limited. Most crime rates in many areas of the United States have been 
declining in recent years, and hence it is difficult to make the case that the 
upward spike in opioid abuse and addiction has had much of an impact on 
crime rates. This is not the same as saying there has been no effect, but 
rather that many different factors affect crime rates and it is difficult to 
extract the precise contribution of opioid abuse to crime rates.  
There are two additional observations of importance to make with respect 
to opioid addiction and crime rates. First, opioid addicts typically do 
not survive for long periods of time and therefore do not remain alive to 
commit crimes. Second, the nature of opioid addiction is such that it saps 
energy and vitality. One is unlikely to commit crimes when one is semi-
inert.
Other Costs Of Addiction
Drug addicts or abusers frequently end up in hospital emergency rooms 
(ERs) and there are costs associated with this. Virginia’s Joint Legislative 
Audit and Review Commission (JLARC) estimated that in 2008, untreated 
substance abuse resulted in $613 million in public safety expenditures 
(police, jail, prison) and health care services by local and regional 
governmental units.31 The average hospital stay for those who were 
admitted because of drug abuse was 3.8 days in 2010 and their average 
treatment cost was $29,497.32 No doubt these numbers are higher today.
It is interesting to note that one well-regarded national study of the 
economic cost of opioid abuse attributed only about one-quarter of the 
30  Virginia Performs, http://vaperforms.virginia.gov/indicators/publicsafety/crime.php.
31   Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, Report to the Governor and the General Assembly of 
Virginia, Mitigating the Costs of Substance Abuse in Virginia. http://jlarc.virginia.gov/dfs/reports/Rpt372.pdf 
(2008).
32  www.latimes.com/nation/la-sci-sn-opioid-overdose-prescription-hospital-er-20141026-story.html.
aggregate national cost of opioid addiction and abuse to governments. The 
lion’s share of the costs is borne by families, employers and charitable 
organizations. Nearly two-thirds of the total economic burden was due to 
health care expenses, substance abuse treatment and lost productivity.    
We want opioid abusers to seek treatment, but the treatment costs also 
can prevent them from doing so. In 2015, the average cost to a patient of 
an uncomplicated emergency room visit was $1,124 in Northern Virginia, 
$1,105 in central Virginia, $819 in southwest Virginia and $746 in eastern 
Virginia.33 Further, the drug substitutes used to move opioid addicts to 
a controlled status also can be pricey. The two most widely used drug 
substitutes are methadone and Suboxone (buprenorphine); each costs 
about $500 per month per individual. These drug substitutes can be 
administered in the form of an implant that slowly releases the curative 
drug over a period of several months, but this costs around $6,000.34 One 
of several goals in instituting a drug substitute program is to reduce the 
size of the clandestine drug market, which often is dominated by organized 
crime and gangs.
33  Virginia Health Information, www.vhi.org/healthcarepricing/procedure.asp?id=ERM22.
34    Matt Gregory, “Drug Addiction: The Cost of a Second Chance” (Feb. 16, 2017), http://drugfreeva.org/drug-
addiction-the-cost-of-a-second-chance.
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Policy Considerations
1.   The foremost need of citizens, physicians and elected officials is to 
acquire more and better information concerning opioid addiction. 
This chapter is a step in that direction. Despite the adverse impact 
of opioid addiction upon labor force participation and even though 
this imposes substantial costs on society, many individuals seem 
unaware of the magnitude of the challenges.  
2.   It is not disputed that some physicians remain uninformed about 
the risks of opioids and are insufficiently trained to prescribe them 
while managing chronic patient pain. A Boston Medical Center 
study examined nearly 3,000 patients who survived an opioid-
related overdose between 2000 and 2012.35 The study found that 
more than 90 percent of these patients continued to receive opioid 
medications from doctors, even after their overdose. Both physician 
and pharmacy education are in order.
3.   Additional financial support should be provided for research into 
nonaddictive, “selective” painkillers such as PZM21 and BU00028 
(both experimental drugs). They offer hope that long-term use of 
opioids need not result in addiction.
4.   We should create a national prescription registry. A recurring 
problem in opiate addiction is the ability of an individual to 
obtain multiple opiate prescriptions from multiple physicians. 
While there are privacy downsides to a national prescription 
registry, the nature of the current crisis suggests that the benefits 
accruing from such a registry probably would outweigh the costs by 
eliminating the ability of people to obtain repeated and duplicative 
prescriptions.  
35   Marc R. Larochelle, Jane M. Liebschutz, Fang Zhang, Dennis Ross-Degnan and J. Frank Wharam. “Opioid 
Prescribing After Nonfatal Overdose and Association With Repeated Overdose: A Cohort Study of Opioid 
Prescribing After Nonfatal Overdose.” Annals of Internal Medicine. American College of Physicians (Jan. 5, 
2016).
5.   The medical community should continue to utilize opiate substitute 
drugs such as methadone to move opiate addicts away from their 
addiction, and drugs such as naloxone to reverse the effects of 
opiate drug overdoses. Almost needless to say, such interventions 
will require funding if they are to make a difference.
6.   Opiate addiction should be regarded as a medical problem. Another 
“war on drugs” is not going to improve the opiate situation we face 
today.
Finally, it should be apparent that opiate misuse and abuse ultimately 
reflect our society – the values, attitudes, laws, geography and range 
of economic opportunities that together make us who we are. Hence, 
one cannot press a single button and eliminate the scourge of opiate 
addiction because this wave of abuse represents the conjunction of a 
set of complex phenomena deep within us. It would take a decade or 
more of attention, education and funding to reverse our current dismal 






Uber is redefining the transportation 
industry now; Airbnb is doing it to the hotel 
industry. You can expect that to happen in 
every single industry.





et there be no doubt. Airbnb is a disrupter. 
The international, internet-based firm 
that connects owners of rental properties 
(“hosts”) with prospective short-term renters 
(“guests”) is upending conventional ways of doing 
business and in the process challenging the market 
positions of the traditional hotel and motel lodging 
industry.
Founded in 2008, Airbnb asserts that it is active 
in more than 65,000 cities and 191 countries and 
that it has facilitated the accommodation of more 
than 200 million guests.1 Airbnb claims to have 
more than 3 million rental listings worldwide and 
its estimated market value exceeded $31 billion in 
early 2017.2 Airbnb is now nearly as valuable as 
the Marriott International hotel group and almost 
twice as valuable as Hilton Worldwide Hotels, 
with a workforce that is 1 percent the size of 
either hotel chain.3
The Commonwealth has not been left behind. 
Airbnb is growing rapidly in many of Virginia’s 
major markets and its rise presents challenges 
to policymakers and the traditional lodging 
sector. In August 2017, 10,395 Airbnb listings 
(mostly involving residential homes) were in 
Virginia, led regionally by Northern Virginia 
with 3,863.4
 1  Airbnb, “About Us,” https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us.
2   Lauren Thomas, “Airbnb just closed a $1 billion round and became 
profitable in 2016.” March 9, 2017, CNBC. https://www.cnbc.
com/2017/03/09/airbnb-closes-1-billion-round-31-billion-valuation-
profitable.html.
3   Maya Kosoff, “Why Airbnb is now almost twice as valuable as Hilton,” 
March 20, 2017, Vanity Fair, https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/03/
why-airbnb-is-now-almost-twice-as-valuable-as-hilton.
4  Airdna data for the Commonwealth received in September 2017. 
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Virtually every new economic phenomenon that upends customary ways of 
doing business stimulates concerns and the rise of Airbnb is no exception. 
Conventional hotels and motels question whether Airbnb is “playing by the 
rules” and many cities and counties worry that they are not collecting all 
taxes due.  
This chapter analyzes the development of Airbnb and places this 
phenomenon in the broader context of the rise of the “gig economy” – a 
world in which occasional contractors, part-time workers and temporary 
economic arrangements increasingly hold sway. What we are observing 
is Joseph Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” in action – yet another 
example of the never-ending churn in the economic system that drives out 
the old and brings in the new.5  
Airbnb In Virginia 
To say that the rise of Airbnb is nothing short of remarkable may be 
an understatement. Starting with the rental of an air mattress in San 
Francisco in 2008, Airbnb has rapidly emerged in terms of listings, 
funding and name recognition. Airbnb continues to expand its business 
model, now offering “experiences” (hosted tours) and an increasing 
number of connections to travel websites. The Commonwealth is no 
exception to the rapid rise of Airbnb and its challenge to the established 
lodging industry.
To track Airbnb’s activities in Virginia, one must rely upon data produced 
by Airdna, a separate and independent organization that generates 
numbers and analytics focusing on vacation rental entrepreneurs and 
investors.6 Throughout this chapter, unless otherwise noted, we use data 
from Airdna to examine the listing, revenue and occupancy of Airbnb-
hosted properties. While there are many other potential short-term rental 
hosts, including Flipkey, Homeaway and VRBO, individual listing data for 
5   Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) was an Austrian-born economist who spent much of his career at Harvard. 
His Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942) is considered a classic in the literature of economic 
development. 
6   As Airbnb does not provide open access to its data, Airdna tracks the performance of listings and predicts 
whether properties are booked or not. For more information, see www.airdna.co/methodology.
these sites are not readily available and Airbnb is clearly the dominant 
player in this growing market. 
Airbnb’s growth in Virginia has been meteoric. Graph 1 illustrates 
the almost fivefold increase in Airbnb listings, from 2,023 in October 
2014 to 10,395 in August 2017. Graph 2 highlights that total revenue 
from Airbnb rentals in Virginia rose from $1.52 million to $17.39 
million over the same period. Revenues from Airbnb rentals grew 
more than 1,000 percent in Virginia in less than three years. 7
How does this compare to the traditional lodging sector? Graph 3 shows 
that the revenues of Airbnb’s Virginia hosts rose from only 0.49 
percent of the revenues of traditional hotels and motels in October 
2014 to 4.67 percent in August 2017. This is an almost tenfold 
increase over a three-year period.
When we examine the performance of the traditional lodging sector, the 
growth in Airbnb listings and revenue becomes even more remarkable. 
Here we use data from STR Global (formerly known as Smith Travel 
Research), a company that provides high-quality data on the performance 
of hotels and motels. Comparing October 2014 to August 2017, the 
supply of traditional hotel rooms in Virginia increased by only 1.7 
percent. Revenue for hotels and motels from August 2015 to August 
2017 only increased by 8 percent.8 While the Airbnb rental sector 
may be smaller than the traditional lodging sector, Airbnb is a rising 
competitor.
What kinds of properties are driving this growth in listings and revenue? 
Hosts can choose to rent out a portion of their property (known as 
“private room rentals”) or to rent out the entire property (known as 
“entire place rentals”). As displayed in Graph 4, the growth of Airbnb’s 
revenue in Virginia is mostly due to entire place rentals rather than 
private room rentals. Revenues from entire place rentals increased from 
$1.15 million in October 2014 to $14.98 million in August 2017. While 
private room revenues increased sixfold during this period, entire 
place revenues increased thirteenfold.
7   This is consistent with the reported national Airbnb growth rate in revenues in 2016 of 138 percent. Airbnb’s 
revenues grew from an estimated $2.4 billion in 2015 to $5.7 billion in 2016. Chris Kirkham and Greg 
Bensinger, “Hotel Group Assails Airbnb Model,” The Wall Street Journal, 269 (March 20, 2017), B4.  
8  STR trend reports: Jan. 24, 2017, and Sept. 15, 2017.
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GRAPH 1
AVAILABLE AND BOOKED LISTINGS OF ALL AIRBNB PROPERTIES: 
VIRGINIA, OCTOBER 2014 TO AUGUST 2017
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GRAPH 2
TOTAL MONTHLY REVENUE FROM ALL AIRBNB PROPERTIES: VIRGINIA, OCTOBER 2014 TO AUGUST 2017 
(MILLIONS OF $)






Total Monthly Revenue from all Airbnb Properties: 












































































































































































RATIO OF AIRBNB’S REVENUE TO TOTAL CONVENTIONAL HOTEL REVENUE: 
VIRGINIA, OCTOBER 2014 TO AUGUST 2017








Ratio of Airbnb’s Revenue to Total Conventional Hotel Revenue: 
Virginia, October 2014 to August 2017 
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GRAPH 4
AIRBNB’S REVENUE FROM ENTIRE PLACE AND PRIVATE ROOM RENTALS: 
VIRGINIA, OCTOBER 2014 TO AUGUST 2017 (MILLIONS OF $)






Airbnb’s Revenue from Entire Place and Private Room Rentals: 
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So far, our discussion has focused on Airbnb listings. A listing on Airbnb 
might consist of a shared room, a private room, a studio apartment or 
several rooms within a house that are available for rent. The number of 
listings understates the number of rooms available through Airbnb. 
This is an important point to consider when one attempts to estimate the 
performance of Airbnb rentals and draw comparisons with traditional 
hotels and motels. 
In August 2017, 7,746 (74.5 percent) of the 10,395 Airbnb listings in 
Virginia were “active” (actually booked listings) in Airdna’s terminology, 
meaning these listings were currently rented or had been rented in the 
last month. On average, each active listing in Virginia involved 1.8 rooms. 
This means that many of the most active listings for Virginia for the 
period in question were for multiple rooms, confirming that property 
listings understate the number of rooms offered for rent. As illustrated 
in Graph 5, the share of revenue derived from the rental of properties 
involving four or more bedrooms has steadily climbed from about 14 
percent in October 2014 to almost 31 percent in August 2017. 
Our “more Airbnb rooms than listings” conclusion is consistent with a 
recent study conducted for the American Hotel and Lodging Association 
by CBRE, a well-known national real estate firm. While the association 
is hardly a neutral party in terms of its attitudes toward Airbnb, its 
commissioned study concluded that one-third of Airbnb’s revenues now 
come from individuals and investors who own or control multiple units 
(see Graph 6).  
When compared to the total number of rooms available in traditional 
hotels and motels in Virginia, Airbnb’s active listings of rooms in August 
2017 was less than 9 percent of the total. To some this might suggest 
that the fears of Airbnb are overstated, but we must draw attention to 
the fact that Airbnb is less than 10 years old. Imagine if the number of 
hotel rooms increased by 9 percent in less than 10 years in Virginia; this 
would represent a remarkable growth in the number of hotels and motels. 
We are confident in our conclusion that Airbnb (and similar firms) have 
become an integral part of the lodging market in Virginia.
Airbnb’s greatest impact on the conventional hotel and motel market 
in Virginia occurs either during peak tourist times, such as the Fourth 
of July and Labor Day or in specific locations – for example, Northern 
Virginia during special events, such as the presidential inauguration. 
During these time periods, Airbnb’s listings surge and it appears that 
the availability of Airbnb as an option discourages conventional hotels 
and motels from increasing their prices as much as they might have in 
the past. Put simply, it appears that Airbnb reduces the profit margins of 
conventional hotels and motels during such peak-load periods.   
The American Hotel and Lodging Association fervently argues that firms 
such as Airbnb functioning in the short-term rental arena are hotels for 
all intents and purposes, albeit ones that often do not have to comply with 
all the rules and regulations confronting standard hotels. Not surprisingly, 
the association advocates a legal and enforcement crackdown on Airbnb 
and similar firms, which increasingly have become viable competitors to 
the association’s members. The association’s reaction in this regard is like 
that observed when any established industry is confronted with a new 
viable competitor that appears to be upending previously well-established 
rules. Witness the reactions of taxicab companies to Uber and Lyft, 
established commercial banks to internet competitors such as Synchrony 
and Quicken, some universities to online learning sites and of course 
dozens of competitors across many industries to Amazon, Facebook and 
Google.  
Airbnb often stresses the role of single-bedroom rentals by its residential 
single-family hosts when it interacts with city and county governments. 
This provides it with political cover because many elected officials are 
reluctant to impose regulations on individual homeowners who believe 
they have the right to use their property as they see fit. While single-
room rentals in residential homes may have been the backbone of 
Airbnb in its formative days, this no longer holds true. We estimate that 
80 percent of Airbnb’s revenues in Virginia Beach are derived from full 
houses, apartments and condos, and that 65 percent of these revenues 
come from properties with multiple bedrooms.  
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GRAPH 5
SHARE OF AIRBNB REVENUE ACCOUNTED FOR BY FOUR OR MORE BEDROOMS IN HOMES:  
VIRGINIA, OCTOBER 2014 TO AUGUST 2017






Share of Airbnb Revenue Accounted for by Four or More Bedrooms in Homes:  
Virginia, October 2014 to August 2017 
 


























































































AIRBNB REVENUE SOURCES: UNITED STATES, 2016
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The Rapid Growth Of Airbnb 
In Virginia’s Metro Areas
We now turn to examining the rise of Airbnb in Virginia’s metropolitan 
areas (MSAs). On average, these metro areas account for about 91 
percent of total hotel revenue and 90 percent of total Airbnb revenue. 
Because of how STR Global defines hotel markets and how the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis defines MSAs are somewhat different, we combine the 
Harrisonburg and Staunton/Waynesboro metro areas into one market. 
Since we are only examining Airbnb in the Commonwealth, the data for 
the Kingsport-Bristol MSA represent only the Virginia portion of this 
metro area.
Airbnb represents a growing share of the lodging market in each of 
Virginia’s metropolitan areas. Graph 7 displays the revenues of Airbnb 
hosts in August 2017. Hampton Roads generated the largest amount of 
revenue in August 2017 ($4.83 million), followed closely by Northern 
Virginia ($4.10 million). The Virginia portion of the Kingsport-Bristol 
MSA had the lowest amount of total monthly revenue, slightly less than 
that of Roanoke. 
When we examine the share of Airbnb revenue to hotel revenue, 
however, a different story emerges from the data. While Charlottesville’s 
total Airbnb revenue for August 2017 was only about $2.5 million, this 
amounted to almost 22 percent of total hotel and motel revenues in that 
region. Lynchburg’s total Airbnb revenue for August 2017 was $780,000, 
but this was equivalent to 15 percent of the total revenue of the traditional 
lodging sector in that area. While many believe that Airbnb is limited 
to dense, urban markets, Graph 8 shows that, as a percentage of hotel 
revenue, Airbnb is performing well in less urbanized markets.
Because Charlottesville and Lynchburg stand out, let’s take a closer look 
at those metro areas. Over the past two years, the number of hotel rooms 
in Lynchburg has remained constant, with about 2,700 rooms available 
for rent. Hotel revenues in Lynchburg increased about 7 percent between 
August 2015 and August 2017, slightly below the 8 percent average 
growth rate for the Commonwealth. Charlottesville, on the other hand, 
has seen its supply of hotel rooms grow by about 6.5 percent, while hotel 
revenues grew by about 19 percent over the same period. The traditional 
lodging sector is underperforming the Commonwealth in Lynchburg, but 
outperforming it in Charlottesville.
What happened to Airbnb during the same period? In Lynchburg, 
available Airbnb listings grew from 54 in October 2014 to 479 in August 
2017, an increase of 787 percent (Graph 9). Booked listings grew from 
36 to 348 for the same period, an increase of 867 percent. Total revenue 
from Airbnb-related rentals in Lynchburg jumped from about $30,000 
to $780,000 in the same period, a twenty-sixfold increase in less than 
three years (Graph 10).
In Charlottesville, available Airbnb listings grew from 323 in October 2014 
to 1,052 in August 2017, an increase of 226 percent (Graph 11). Booked 
listings grew from 218 to 883, an increase of 305 percent over the same 
period. Total revenue from Airbnb rentals increased from about $380,000 
to $2.47 million, an increase of 550 percent (Graph 12). Not only were 
more listings available for rent in Lynchburg and Charlottesville, but 
also a higher percentage of listings were rented over time.
What is driving the revenue growth in Lynchburg and Charlottesville? 
In Lynchburg, revenues from entire place rentals increased by almost 
3,370 percent in less than three years (Graph 13). For the same period, 
Charlottesville saw an increase of about 600 percent in Airbnb revenues 
from entire place rentals (Graph 14). As with the Commonwealth, the 
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GRAPH 8
RATIO OF AIRBNB’S REVENUE TO HOTEL REVENUE IN VIRGINIA AND ITS MAJOR METROS IN AUGUST 2017  






Ratio of Airbnb’s Revenue to Hotel Revenue in Virginia and Its Major Metros in August 2017   
 
 

















AVAILABLE AND BOOKED LISTINGS OF ALL AIRBNB PROPERTIES: 
LYNCHBURG, OCTOBER 2014 TO AUGUST 2017
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GRAPH 10
TOTAL MONTHLY REVENUE FROM ALL AIRBNB PROPERTIES: 
LYNCHBURG, OCTOBER 2014 TO AUGUST 2017 (MILLIONS OF $)
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AVAILABLE AND BOOKED LISTINGS OF ALL AIRBNB PROPERTIES: 
CHARLOTTESVILLE, OCTOBER 2014 TO AUGUST 2017
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GRAPH 12
TOTAL MONTHLY REVENUE FROM ALL AIRBNB PROPERTIES: 
CHARLOTTESVILLE, OCTOBER 2014 TO AUGUST 2017 (MILLIONS OF $)
Source: Airdna data for the Commonwealth received in September 2017
GRAPH 12 
Total Monthly Revenue from all Airbnb Properties: 
Charlottesville, October 2014 to August 2017 (Millions of $) 
 
 































































































































































AIRBNB’S REVENUE FROM ENTIRE PLACE AND PRIVATE ROOMS: 
LYNCHBURG, OCTOBER 2014 TO AUGUST 2017 (MILLIONS OF $)
Source: Airdna data for the Commonwealth received in September 2017
GRAPH 13 
Airbnb’s Revenue from Entire Place and Private Rooms: 
Lynchburg, October 2014 to August 2017 (Millions of $) 
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GRAPH 14
AIRBNB’S REVENUE FROM ENTIRE PLACE AND PRIVATE ROOMS: 
CHARLOTTESVILLE, OCTOBER 2014 TO AUGUST 2017 (MILLIONS OF $)
Source: Airdna data for the Commonwealth received in September 2017
GRAPH 14 
Airbnb’s Revenue from Entire Place and Private Rooms: 





































































































































































Some Measures Of The 
Performance Of Hotels 
And Airbnb
With Airbnb’s rapid increases in listings and revenues, one might conclude 
that its rentals are outperforming the traditional hotel industry. Before we 
can reach this conclusion, however, we need to compare apples to apples; 
that is, we need to use comparable measures of performance over the 
short term and across traditional lodging sectors.
The gold standard of the lodging industry is revenue per available room 
(RevPAR). RevPAR captures the average revenue received by a host 
per room available and captures both supply and demand influences. 
STR Global uses room nights to calculate the measures and, as we noted 
previously, we need to calculate on a similar basis for Airbnb’s rentals 
because its listings are not equal to room nights.
How has the traditional lodging sector been performing in Virginia’s 
metropolitan areas? We look at data for 2016 and 2017 in the months of 
January and July. Typically, the demand for hotel rooms is the lowest in 
January and highest in July. As illustrated in Table 1, the Commonwealth 
overall and every one of Virginia’s metros saw growth in hotel RevPAR 
from January 2016 to January 2017, with the exceptionally large increase 
for Northern Virginia likely associated with the presidential inauguration 
and the Women’s March on Washington. The story is more nuanced when 
we compare July 2016 to July 2017. One possible explanation is that 
Airbnb hosts exit the market when there is low demand and enter the 
market when demand is higher. This would limit the ability of hoteliers 
to increase prices during periods of peak demand.
TABLE 1
NOMINAL REVPAR FOR HOTELS: VIRGINIA AND SELECTED METROS, 2016 AND 2017
 Jan-16 Jul-16 Jan-17 Jul-17 Growth Jan-Jan Growth July-July
Virginia $40.51 $84.09 $48.24 $85.17 19.08% 1.28%
Blacksburg $28.42 $61.34 $28.86 $60.34 1.55% -1.63%
Charlottesville $51.12 $98.97 $52.70 $102.09 3.09% 3.15%
Hampton Roads $26.90 $105.38 $30.85 $108.31 14.68% 2.78%
Harrisonburg-
Staunton
$34.08 $67.12 $36.45 $67.08 6.95% -0.06%
Kingsport-Bristol, 
VA
$24.00 $49.20 $24.02 $47.54 0.08% -3.37%
Lynchburg $35.27 $61.82 $40.26 $55.41 14.15% -10.37%
Northern Virginia $55.15 $91.51 $73.45 $94.01 33.18% 2.73%
Richmond $44.15 $66.28 $45.27 $64.88 2.54% -2.11%
Roanoke $29.98 $53.74 $30.90 $53.70 3.07% -0.07%
Source: STR trend reports: Jan. 24, 2017, and Sept. 15, 2017
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How did Airbnb hosts fare during this period? As shown in Table 2, 
RevPAR for Airbnb hosts was lower than that of hotels. Airbnb hosts 
didn’t earn as much per available room as traditional hoteliers. On the 
other hand, Airbnb RevPAR increased quite dramatically in Virginia and 
almost all the metropolitan areas. With few exceptions, RevPAR increased 
in every metro area, regardless of the period in question. While RevPAR 
for hotels jumped 33 percent in Northern Virginia in January 2017, Airbnb 
RevPAR jumped over 100 percent. These large increases in RevPAR 
suggest that Airbnb hosts can not only command higher prices over time 
for their rooms and houses, but they also are gaining the ability to engage 
in “surge pricing” for special events, such as the presidential inauguration.
TABLE 2
NOMINAL AIRBNB REVPAR: VIRGINIA AND SELECTED METROS, 2016 AND 2017
 Jan-16 Jul-16 Jan-17 Jul-17 Growth Jan-Jan Growth July-July
Virginia $11.77 $32.95 $19.30 $37.53 63.98% 13.90%
Blacksburg $6.34 $16.42 $14.10 $27.04 122.40% 64.68%
Charlottesville $17.74 $34.37 $22.65 $42.07 27.68% 22.40%
Hampton Roads $9.55 $47.65 $13.52 $45.02 41.57% -5.52%
Harrisonburg-
Staunton
$17.32 $26.99 $15.98 $32.06 -7.74% 18.78%
Kingsport-Bristol, 
VA
$2.35 $13.89 $3.02 $20.82 28.51% 49.89%
Lynchburg $7.37 $23.04 $11.18 $34.01 51.70% 47.61%
Northern Virginia $13.29 $36.27 $26.86 $33.03 102.11% -8.93%
Richmond $10.93 $26.50 $18.30 $28.94 67.43% 9.21%
Roanoke $7.20 $26.18 $9.45 $35.34 31.25% 34.99%
Source: Airdna data for the Commonwealth received in September 2017
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Comparing Airbnb In 
Virginia Cities To 
Out-Of-State Cities
How do Virginia cities compare to other markets where Airbnb is 
concerned? We have selected cities in six metropolitan regions in other 
states where Airbnb is active for comparison. It should be noted that, 
since we do not have access to STR data on metropolitan areas outside 
of Virginia, all comparisons, including those for cities in Virginia, are 
based on Airdna reports. In all the comparator cities, Airbnb listings 
grew rapidly from 2011 through 2016 (see Table 3). While some of the 
rapid growth can be attributed to the initially small number of the overall 
listings, even those markets with relatively large Airbnb listing pools saw 
double- and triple-digit growth over this period. Between 2015 and 2016, 
the Airbnb market segment in the city of Virginia Beach grew the fastest 
of any of the 12 cities listed in Table 3. 
Virginia Beach, however, stands out in term of the nature of its rentals. 
Using active-listing data from March 2017, Table 4 enables us to see that 
over one-quarter of listings in Virginia Beach were for four-plus bedroom 
listings, 10 percentage points higher than the next city, Nashville. This 
reflects the existence of many large, four-plus bedroom buildings along the 
oceanfront that are rented to large groups for weekends or entire weeks. 
Parenthetically, these also tend to be the Airbnb properties that generate 
the most complaints concerning unruly behavior, illegal parking, trash and 
the like.
TABLE 3
CURRENTLY ACTIVE AIRBNB LISTINGS: SELECTED CITIES, 2011-2016
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Growth 
2015-2016
Arlington 30 53 94 178 448 982 119.20%
Charleston 10 28 74 156 395 906 129.37%
Jacksonville 4 8 18 45 132 311 135.61%
Lynchburg 5 .. .. 14 74 172 132.43%
Nashville 18 50 147 525 1,600 3,400 112.50%
New Orleans 65 200 545 1,100 2,400 4,600 91.67%
Norfolk 2 6 8 14 63 153 142.86%
Portland 82 226 527 1,100 2,200 3,800 72.73%
Richmond 4 9 25 71 459 642 39.87%
Roanoke .. 1 3 9 38 90 136.84%
Savannah 17 35 106 166 283 619 118.73%
Virginia Beach 1 9 20 47 156 392 151.28%
Source: Airdna reports
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TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE AIRBNB LISTINGS: SELECTED CITIES, MARCH 2017
Studio 1 Bedroom 2 Bedroom 3 Bedroom 4+ Bedroom
Arlington 6.45% 45.66% 32.37% 9.83% 5.68%
Charleston 4.26% 28.61% 32.60% 23.52% 11.00%
Jacksonville 4.38% 32.50% 34.38% 19.38% 9.38%
Lynchburg 11.84% 28.95% 31.58% 15.79% 11.84%
Nashville 4.50% 22.44% 31.48% 25.80% 15.79%
New Orleans 6.51% 37.22% 34.57% 14.04% 7.66%
Norfolk 5.75% 25.29% 43.68% 14.94% 10.34%
Portland 15.42% 41.59% 27.66% 9.86% 5.48%
Richmond 6.19% 37.61% 28.76% 19.47% 7.96%
Roanoke 8.16% 34.69% 24.49% 24.49% 8.16%
Savannah 4.43% 35.82% 34.75% 15.60% 9.40%
Virginia Beach 6.86% 23.53% 27.45% 16.18% 25.98%
Source: Airdna reports
With respect to occupancy, Arlington leads Virginia cities in terms of its 
average Airbnb occupancy rate (see Table 5). Here, however, we must be 
careful because Airdna listing data ordinarily assume a one-listing, one-
room relationship when the typical listing involves an average of almost 
two rooms. Hence, the occupancy data presented in Table 5 are biased 
strongly upward – perhaps as much as 100 percent on average. Portland’s 
60.33 percent Airbnb occupancy rate, for example, in fourth quarter 2016 
may be in the range of 30 to 35 percent.   
In general, the less seasonal a market, the higher its average occupancy 
rate. Airbnb activity in Arlington is not as closely tied to tourism as it is in 
Virginia Beach.  
STR data reveal an average occupancy rate of 57.9 percent for 
conventional hotels and motels located in Virginia for the fourth quarter 
of 2016. The unweighted average Airbnb occupancy rate was 47.8 
percent in the same period, but as just noted, this does not consider the 
phenomenon of multiple rooms per listing. Airbnb properties tend to be 
occupied less than traditional hotels, suggesting that many hosts struggle 
to rent their properties on a consistent basis.  
Remember that RevPAR is revenue per available room and refers to the 
average revenue received by a host per room available. Again, however, 
we must issue a caution. Airdna’s data report RevPAR per listing and 
there usually are multiple rooms attached to a single listing. Consequently, 
Airdna’s data are biased strong upward here as well.
103
TABLE 5
AVERAGE AIRBNB OCCUPANCY RATES: SELECTED CITIES, 2016
1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter
Arlington 57.67% 70.67% 66.33% 57.67%
Charleston 43.33% 63.67% 55.00% 44.67%
Jacksonville 64.00% 61.33% 58.33% 58.00%
Lynchburg 30.67% 39.00% 45.00% 44.33%
Nashville 44.00% 59.33% 55.67% 46.67%
New Orleans 47.33% 52.67% 38.00% 43.00%
Norfolk 34.00% 49.33% 53.33% 42.67%
Portland 56.00% 74.00% 84.67% 60.33%
Richmond 38.33% 51.00% 55.33% 51.67%
Roanoke 32.00% 53.67% 58.67% 47.67%
Savannah 48.33% 56.33% 51.67% 44.00%
Virginia Beach 30.33% 52.67% 59.33% 32.33%
Source: Airdna market reports 
Note: Smith Travel Research reported a room occupancy rate of 57.9 percent for conventional hotels and motels located in Virginia for fourth quarter 2016.
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With this caveat in mind, we can observe in Table 6 that Arlington once 
again leads the Virginia pack, though Lynchburg, Norfolk, Richmond and 
Virginia Beach all recorded considerably higher growth rates in their 
RevPARs between 2015 and 2016.  
There are two additional inferences we can draw from Table 6. One is 
that there is wide dispersion in RevPARs among the cities and in RevPAR 
growth rates as well. The other is that if we were to divide the reported 
Airbnb RevPARs by two to take account of the listings versus rooms 
problem, then the average October 2016 RevPAR of $75.48 in conventional 
hotels and motels was substantially higher than actual Airbnb RevPAR in 
any of the 12 cities covered.  
Turning next to Airbnb revenues, we examine total earnings of Airbnb 
hosts from various rentals in 2016. Virginia Beach stands out from the 
other cities in this regard because it has the highest percentage of revenue 
earned through listings for four bedrooms or more (see Table 7). Virginia 
Beach’s share of revenue from four or more bedroom rentals (36.6 percent 
of revenue earned) eclipsed that of all other cities in our sample.  
If tax revenue collections are a major concern for cities, then the data 
in Table 7 strongly suggest that cities’ attention should be focused on 
the multiple-bedroom Airbnb properties. In a city such as Virginia 
Beach, almost three-quarters of all revenue earned by Airbnb hosts is 
derived from multiple-bedroom properties,9 while it is 66 percent in 
Richmond and almost 63 percent in Arlington.  
9   We estimate that almost 80 percent of the lodging taxes that the city of Virginia Beach collects from Airbnb 
hosts is derived from hosts who rent full houses, apartments or condos.
TABLE 6
NOMINAL AIRBNB REVPAR PER LISTING: SELECTED CITIES, 2015 AND 2016
May-15 Oct-15 May-16 Oct-16 Growth May-May Growth Oct-Oct
Arlington  $       83.43  $       77.00  $     99.82  $     86.86 19.65% 12.80%
Charleston  $       97.71  $       92.29  $   134.11  $   111.86 37.24% 21.21%
Jacksonville  $       42.86  $       51.29  $     54.11  $     47.00 26.25% -8.36%
Nashville  $       81.43  $     100.43  $   128.93  $   133.14 58.33% 32.57%
New Orleans  $       95.14  $       90.71  $   106.79  $     86.57 12.24% -4.57%
Norfolk  $       58.29  $       35.86  $     69.82  $     54.57 19.79% 52.19%
Portland  $       70.71  $       79.14  $     84.11  $     77.43 18.94% -2.17%
Richmond  $       54.14  $       52.71  $     67.32  $     70.00 24.34% 32.79%
Roanoke  $       56.86  $       50.57  $     48.75  $     54.14 -14.26% 7.06%
Savannah  $       81.57  $       74.57  $   114.11  $   111.00 39.89% 48.85%
Lynchburg  $       38.00  $       37.00  $     63.93  $     50.14 68.23% 35.52%
Virginia Beach  $       59.71  $       39.14  $     97.68  $     58.86 63.58% 50.36%
Source: Airdna reports 
Note: Smith Travel Research reports that RevPAR in conventional hotels and motels in Virginia was $75.48 in October 2016 and that it grew 6.6 percent between October 2015 and October 2016.
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TABLE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF AIRBNB EARNINGS BY RENTAL TYPE: SELECTED CITIES, 2016









Arlington 3.06% 8.79% 9.78% 15.60% 19.90% 17.08% 25.80%
Charleston 1.09% 7.50% 10.93% 15.48% 16.37% 18.40% 30.22%
Jacksonville 2.41% 9.84% 12.11% 14.77% 17.23% 17.90% 25.73%
Lynchburg 0.00% 10.76% 12.57% 15.98% 20.45% 11.93% 28.30%
Nashville 2.60% 6.74% 11.90% 13.16% 14.17% 20.78% 30.66%
New Orleans 3.05% 6.31% 10.29% 11.18% 14.82% 18.14% 36.22%
Norfolk 0.56% 11.28% 11.62% 16.17% 20.96% 18.78% 20.62%
Portland 3.78% 7.23% 12.28% 12.65% 16.04% 21.03% 26.98%
Richmond 2.85% 6.95% 9.05% 14.49% 14.77% 19.49% 32.39%
Roanoke 0.00% 10.35% 15.09% 14.71% 17.80% 19.74% 22.30%
Savannah 1.76% 9.37% 11.42% 11.96% 15.72% 15.67% 34.11%
Virginia Beach 1.04% 9.66% 2.26% 12.12% 17.65% 20.67% 36.59%
Source: Airdna reports
The moral to the story revealed by the data in Table 7 is once again 
that cities that decide to devote considerable resources to forcing 
compliance from hosts renting shared or private rooms are likely to 
find that the costs of doing so will exceed the incremental revenues 
they receive from this enforcement. Simply put, this is not where the 
revenue is. The hundreds of small Airbnb hosts who come and go from the 
market are difficult to track and would present significant challenges to 
enforcement personnel. Further, we predict that specialized, possibly 
hard-to-track Airbnb imitators will rise in importance as they address 
the specific circumstances of populations, ranging from gay people 
and Catholics to women and military veterans. The point is that the 
more of these hosting organizations there are, the more difficult it will 
be for cities to enforce any ordinances that putatively apply to such 
operations.
There is another fundamental conclusion to be drawn from our analysis. 
Given the sometimes, almost casual nature of the Airbnb phenomenon, it 
is not an easy task for cities to collect the taxes due from Airbnb hosts. 
Any tax based upon revenues or sales will be challenged by problems 
connected to tracking and identifying both Airbnb hosts and their 
activities. This dictum applies both to the city’s lodging and occupancy 
taxes and to the Commonwealth’s sales tax.  
Identification and collection problems may diminish, however, if it is 
income rather than sales that becomes subject to taxation. Airbnb and 
related hosts may believe they can thumb their noses at cities, but they are 
less likely to hold that attitude with respect to the federal government’s 
Internal Revenue Service, which possesses a variety of digitized tools 
to identify scofflaws and can levy some impressive penalties to inspire 
cooperation.  
Perish the thought: city income taxes, perhaps piggybacked on the state 
or federal income taxes, may turn out to be the wave of the future in 
the gig economy – if cities are serious about collecting taxes due from 
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Airbnb hosts and the multitude of other gig economy entrepreneurs 
who increasingly are inhabiting the cities’ economic environment. We 
make this observation not because we are advocates of income taxes 
per se, but rather as dispassionate observers of economic trends. 
Sales-related taxes may become increasingly difficult to collect.
IS THERE A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE GROWTH 
OF AIRBNB AND HOTEL BEHAVIOR?
Costs and prices make a difference, or so at least academic economists tell 
their students. While a more rigorous analysis would be required to 
render a definitive judgment, prima facie it appears that the pricing 
behavior of Virginia hotels is partially responsible for the rapid 
growth of Airbnb in their respective cities. Alert consumers look for 
opportunities to substitute less-expensive goods for those that are more 
expensive, and rental rooms are no exception. Rising hotel room prices 
stimulate cost-conscious tourists and business travelers to contemplate 
alternatives, including Airbnb, which may result in hotels losing market 
share to competitors such as Airbnb.  
Unless dramatic action is taken by cities, it is safe to say that 
Airbnb and similar rental contractors are not going to disappear. 
Nevertheless, traditional hotels in the Commonwealth have three 
major avenues open to enable them to become more competitive 
with respect to Airbnb and similar firms. First, they can be more 
modest in terms of future price increases and perhaps even adjust 
their current prices by means of special sales or offerings. Second, 
they can make their properties and offerings more enticing, such 
that accommodations are more personal, engaging and memorable 
(qualities many Airbnb customers say attract them to Airbnb 
accommodations). Third, cities can make their hotels more attractive 
by addressing issues such as traffic control, parking availability and 
cost, and perceived safety. If such developments do not occur, then 
simple, but straightforward economic analysis suggests that Airbnb’s 
growth will continue apace.     
Policy Alternatives
It is not blindingly obvious where the public interest resides in the debates 
concerning the activities of Airbnb and similar firms in Virginia because 
there are competing points of view, each supported by some favorable 
evidence. 
A rough definition of the public interest is that it coincides with activities 
that do the most good for the most people. If we adopt this view, then it 
follows that it is not the job of government to protect existing firms 
and industries from new, more efficient or more attractive competitors 
that would serve consumers better and do so at lower prices. If it 
were, then horse-and-buggy manufacturers and producers of 8-track 
and cassette tapes still would be dominant because both would have been 
protected from new competition.   
Enabling citizen consumers to spend their dollars where they wish 
is a welfare-maximizing stance for government to adopt, provided 
this consumption does not generate undesirable side effects such as 
pollution, noise, traffic congestion, crime, unsanitary conditions that 
impact public health and the like. As a rule, challenging competing firms 
to meet “the market test” – that is, offer goods and services at prices and 
levels of quality that are attractive to consumers and do not generate the 
side effects just noted – not only is an equitable approach that treats all 
citizens and firms the same, but also generates the best overall results 
for the citizenry. “Best overall” here means presenting consumers with a 
larger selection of goods and services at lower prices.      
An important question relating to Airbnb in Virginia is whether all 
parties are being treated the same – literally, whether all participants 
(Airbnb and traditional hotels alike) have had to meet the same 
market test under the same rules. We believe the answer is no and that 
some Airbnb hosts have consciously evaded (and been able to avoid) 
city regulations and taxes.  
This said, it does not follow that it would be wise for cities to 
devote substantial resources to ensuring that every Airbnb-type 
host complies with all of the city’s ordinances. Let’s use Virginia 
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Beach as an example. Airbnb hosts who rent single or shared single 
rooms in private homes accounted for a very small percentage of the 
total number of rooms available in Virginia Beach during 2016 and 
generated only about one-fifth of that city’s potential tax revenues 
from Airbnb-like activities. Further, these hosts do not often appear to 
be the sources of behavioral problems (noise, trash, crime, etc.).  
Cities would be wise to devote their scarce enforcement resources to 
identifying and obtaining compliance from Airbnb hosts offering their 
entire place for rent. Plainly speaking, this is where the revenue is and 
evidence suggests that any behavioral problems that Airbnb generates 
are concentrated among these properties as well. This is not the same 
as saying that the city should ignore ordinances that apply to the Airbnb 
small fry. Instead, it is a rational economic calculation that expending 
resources on such does not make much sense, just as members of the 
city’s police force do not issue citations to every motorist who is traveling 
32 MPH in a 30 MPH zone.  
Larger Virginia cities might usefully imitate San Francisco in terms 
of its relationship with Airbnb. San Francisco negotiated an agreement 
with Airbnb that, among other things, uses the Airbnb administrative 
structure to collect taxes due from Airbnb hosts. If Virginia cities can 
replicate this, then the revenues they receive from small Airbnb-like hosts 
plausibly could exceed the costs required to collect them. However, this 
will not be easily accomplished because it imposes costs on Airbnb and 
plausibly reduces both its own profits and those of its hosts. Airbnb is 
unlikely to comply immediately or happily. We recognize this, but note that 
the somewhat similar circumstances surrounding Amazon eventually have 
resulted in Amazon collecting and remitting sales taxes to jurisdictions, 
even where Amazon has no physical presence. We believe the same 
evolutionary process will occur in markets where firms such as Airbnb 
operate. 
Finally, to return to a theme developed above, traditional hotel 
operators would be well advised to re-evaluate their pricing and 
quality strategies. Airbnb and similar rental hosting firms are not 
going to go away. In contrast to Uber, which is losing several billion 
dollars per year and has yet to demonstrate a viable business model, 
Airbnb is a profitable enterprise that already in August 2016 was valued at 
$30 billion when it raised $850 million in a private offering.10 To place this 
in perspective, this is about 25 percent higher than the value of the entire 
Hilton Hotel chain.  
The notion that the meteoric growth of Airbnb and similar hosts can 
be choked off by punitive law enforcement is naive. Nor would this 
be a good idea. Airbnb and similar rental hosting firms appear to be 
meeting the market test, and traditional hotels need to ensure that 
they do so as well.  
Implications Of The 
Gig Economy For Virginia 
Cities And Counties
It would be shortsighted for anyone to view the Airbnb phenomenon as 
an isolated development. Instead, Airbnb is one part of a much larger 
socioeconomic trend that some have chosen to term the “gig economy.” In 
the gig world, employees are not permanent; rather, they are temporary 
contractors who accomplish a task and then move on to something else (or 
nothing at all) with another employer, or even the same employer, but for 
a different, delimited task.  
More gig activity has occurred in 2017 than in years previous, and more 
occupations and tasks are being filled or satisfied by gig workers than 
ever before. Intuit, the software company that produces products such as 
Quicken and TurboTax, predicts that 40 percent of all workers will be gig 
employees by 2020.11 Graph 15 illustrates the dramatic growth in contract 
and temporary employees in the U.S. economy.
10  Matt Rosoff, “Airbnb Is Now Worth $30 Billion,” Business Insider (Aug. 6, 2016), www.businessinsider.com.
11   Intuit 2020 Report. Ten Trends That Will Shape the Next Decade. https://http-download.intuit.com/http.
intuit/CMO/intuit/futureofsmallbusiness/intuit_2020_report.pdf.
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GRAPH 15
THE INCREASING NUMBER OF PART-TIME AND GIG EMPLOYEES IN THE UNITED STATES










Source: The Wall Street Journal, 269 (Feb. 3, 2017), A10 
	
Estimates suggest a sharp increase in the percentage of the U.S. 
workforce that isn't employed directly by the company where they work. 
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Note: A janitor who is employed by a contract firm and cleans five unrelated offices a week 
is counted as working for more than one client. Data for 1995 and 2005 don't include exact 
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These are among the major implications for cities in Virginia:
•  Cities and counties will be dealing with many more workers 
(including Airbnb hosts) who don’t fit traditional categories, are 
not accustomed to applying for things such as business licenses, may 
or may not be willing to pay established taxes (or even be aware 
they exist), can be difficult to track down, and who actually may be 
located thousands of miles away from them. 
•  Jurisdictions seeking to economize and do the best for their citizen 
taxpayers likely will choose to hire more temporary workers. Must 
they place limits on their employment of contractual workers even if this 
turns out to cost more money?
•  Jurisdictions must decide what levels of fringe benefits (if any) 
they will provide contractual employees, particularly when their 
employment period is lengthy, or when the individual is employed 
repetitively. I.e., how long or often must someone be employed in 
order for the city’s obligations to such employees change?  
•  Jurisdictions will find that the gig economy workers who actually 
reside in Virginia (though perhaps only for a period of time) will 
place larger demands upon their schools and social services, 
and perhaps on other agencies such as law enforcement and the 
judicial system. For better or worse, permanence of residence and 
permanence of employment are significant predictors of positive 
social behavior.  
•  Schools will find that increasing proportions of their students 
will come and go because their parents or guardians literally are 
footloose, or their financial circumstances have changed.  
•  Jurisdictions may conclude that many conventional measures of 
achievement, such as college degrees, do not fit the gig world as well 
as certificates and certifications. Thus, being certified as a project 
manager, court reporter, EMT, internet network specialist, massage 
therapist or licensed nurse often is more important than having earned a 
baccalaureate degree. 
•  If we put aside seasonable agricultural work, then the gig economy 
currently is proportionately overrepresented with Caucasians, many 
of whom are well educated and even wealthy. To the extent that the 
city employs gig economy workers, it may find that these workers are 
not representative either of Virginia demographics or the population 
of the Commonwealth. Jurisdictions must be proactive if they wish a 
different outcome. Further, reputable recent evidence suggests that 
many Airbnb hosts engage in racial discrimination based upon the 
names of prospective renters.12 Virginia should be alert to the possibility 
that conventional means of enforcing nondiscrimination ordinances 
in housing and accommodations, as well as policies monitoring its 
short-term rental market and overall revenue sources, may have been 
rendered less effective by gig economy developments.     
12   Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca and Dan Svirsky, “Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence 
from a Field Experiment,” American Journal of Applied Economics, 9 (April 2017), 1-22.
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–  Chris Jones, Chairman of the Virginia House 
of Delegates Appropriations Committee, 
after learning of the College of William & 
Mary’s substantial increase in tuition and 
fees, May 16, 2016 
The precise causes of this increase are not yet 
well understood.
–  The President’s Council of Economic 




ere one to ask a random sample 
of the 388,000 students currently 
attending one of Virginia’s many 
fine public colleges and universities questions 
about the cost of their education, one likely 
would be regaled with tales of woe. Such 
students no doubt will complain that the price 
of attendance has gone up too rapidly and that 
as a result, many of them have been forced 
to go deep into debt. They will tell you that 
the cost of attending Virginia’s colleges and 
universities has leaped far ahead of the growth 
in their family incomes, or in the consumer 
price index (CPI).1
These are not unsubstantiated claims. Between 
2001-02 and 2016-17, total increases in the 
published “sticker prices” of tuition and fees 
at Virginia’s four-year institutions ranged 
from a low of 149.8 percent at Old Dominion 
University to a high of 344.2 percent at the 
College of William & Mary. Increases in the 
Virginia Community College System ranged 
from Richard Bland College’s 246 percent to 
Northern Virginia Community College’s 349 
percent. Graphs 1 and 2 report these data 
plus information for selected Virginia public 
institutions of higher education. These data 
come from the Chronicle of Higher Education, 
1   Partners 4 Affordable Excellence @ EDU, a 501-c-3 nonprofit 
foundation, commissioned a public opinion poll in late 2016 that was 
mounted by two highly reputable polling organizations of differing 
political leanings. Among the results: 85 percent of respondents 
believe that Virginia public higher education is not affordable; 90 
percent do not believe their incomes are keeping up with the rising 
price of higher education; 77 percent believe that policymakers 
should find ways to lower the cost of attending a public college.
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which maintains a large easily accessible tuition and fee database on the 
nation’s colleges and universities.
As we shall see, there are real-world consequences associated with these 
cost increases. They include the inability of many Virginians to afford to 
attend a public college, or to have to do so on a part-time basis; increasing 
levels of student and family debt; increasing social and economic 
stratification of student bodies; and a drag on Virginia’s economic 
growth because indebted current or former students don’t buy homes or 
automobiles and don’t start new businesses. These are among the reasons 
why Virginia’s economy has grown more slowly than that of the United 
States for six consecutive years.2 It also helps explain why enrollment 
in Virginia’s public institutions of higher education has crept downward 
every year since 2011 (see Graph 3). Simply put, increasing numbers of 
potential students have decided that our public colleges have become too 
expensive compared to the benefits they generate in return.
2  See chapter 1 of this report.
Sticker prices are the charges approved by boards of visitors and 
published in catalogs. They differ from the actual prices that students 
end up paying because of financial grants students may receive. These 
actual prices are labeled net prices. This situation is analogous to the 
difference between the sticker price of a new automobile and the actual 
sales prices that a purchaser negotiates.  
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GRAPH 1
PERCENT CHANGE IN IN-STATE TUITION AND FEES,  
VIRGINIA FOUR-YEAR PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, 2001-02 TO 2016-17
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GRAPH 2
TOTAL PERCENT INCREASE IN IN-STATE TUITION AND FEES, 
SELECTED VIRGINIA TWO-YEAR PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, 2001-02 TO 2016-17








Source: Chronicle of Higher Education, www.che.edu. HEPI is the higher education price index published by the Commonfund and is 
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GRAPH 3
DECLINING FALL SEMESTER HEADCOUNTS AT VIRGINIA’S PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
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Comparing Tuition And Fee 
Increases To Changes In 
Prices And Incomes
Published tuition and fee charges at Virginia’s public institutions have 
far outpaced both the CPI-U (the consumer price index for all urban 
consumers)3 and changes in the median household incomes of Virginians. 
Further, tuition and fee increases have dwarfed those that have occurred 
in other segments of the U.S. economy. Graph 4 reports changes in a 
variety of prices and incomes between 2006-07 and 2016-17. Note that 
the average total tuition and fee increase at a Virginia four-year public 
college or university during this period was 74 percent, compared to a 40.7 
percent increase in the costs of medical care services (doctors, insurance 
payments, pharmaceuticals, etc.).   
Meanwhile, the CPI-U increased only 18.7 percent during these years – 
only about one-quarter as much as the increase in published tuition and 
fees. Graph 5 shows the relationship between the average tuition and fee 
increase at four-year public institutions in Virginia and the CPI-U. Tuition 
and fee increases have exceeded the growth of the CPI-U 15 years in a row.
During the same time span, median household income rose by a total of 
22.4 percent, but in real, price-adjusted terms actually declined by 8.6 
percent. The upshot is that tuition and fees have been spiraling upward 
at the very time when the ability of the typical Virginia household to 
pay such prices has been in decline. The average published tuition 
and fee charge at a Virginia four-year public institution increased 3.3 
times as fast as Virginia median household income between 2001 and 
2016.  
An interesting and relevant way to assess the ability of Virginians to 
pay for Virginia public higher education is to ask the following question: 
How many hours of work would it take for a Virginia worker earning the 
Commonwealth’s median (50th percentile) wage rate to pay the average 
tuition and fee charge at a Virginia four-year or two-year public college 
3  The CPI-U covers approximately 80 percent of all Americans.  
or university? Graph 6 provides this information, which is eye-opening. In 
2001, 227.7 hours of work were required for a Virginian earning the 
median hourly wage to pay for tuition and fees at the typical four-year 
public Virginia institution. (And this was before taxes.) By 2016, the 
number of hours of work required had grown to 438. For the Virginia 
Community College System, the comparable numbers were 140.2 and 
234.2.  
Even though need-based financial aid has increased (which we 
document later), it is difficult to avoid concluding that the typical 
Virginian gradually is being priced out of access to public higher 
education. The financial barriers to public higher education that 
confront prospective Virginia students and their families progressively 
have grown larger.  
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GRAPH 4
COMPARING TUITION AND FEE INCREASES AT VIRGINIA’S PUBLIC FOUR-YEAR INSTITUTIONS 
TO CHANGES IN OTHER PRICES, 2006-07 TO 2016-17
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GRAPH 5
COMPARING AVERAGE FOUR-YEAR PUBLIC TUITION AND FEE INCREASES 
AT VIRGINIA PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS TO THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, FY 2001 TO FY 2016
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Net Prices Are 
Most Important
The tuition and fee numbers presented thus far have been “sticker 
prices” – the charges approved by each institution’s board of visitors and 
subsequently published in their catalogs. At some colleges and universities, 
only small proportions of the student bodies actually pay these sticker 
prices and the massive remainder pays lower prices because they receive 
financial grants. These grants can be need-based or merit-based, the 
latter perhaps reflecting superior grades and standardized test scores, or a 
particular talent such as athletic prowess, acting ability or musical talent.  
The most common grant received by financially needy students is a 
federal Pell Grant, which currently cannot exceed $5,815 annually. 
Instead of, or in addition to Pell Grants, institutions may provide 
students with other financial grants that do not need to be paid back. 
Institutional endowments commonly are thought to be the major source 
of such funds, but reality is that internally redistributed tuition and fee 
monies provide the most dollars for such grants. There are two primary 
sources of redistributed funds. First, out-of-state students are charged 
premium prices and the dollars they contribute subsequently are allocated 
by institutions for a variety of purposes, including financial grants to 
students. Second, students hailing from families with higher incomes 
effectively are charged higher prices and often their tuition dollars are 
reallocated via grants to other students who come to campus from lower-
income families.    
In effect, the pricing policies of most colleges and universities today 
(including both public and independent institutions in Virginia, two-
year and four-year alike) administer a collegiate version of a steeply 
progressive income tax, taking from the more wealthy and giving to the 
less wealthy by means of the net prices each group pays.4 Again, “net 
price” here refers to the effective price each student ends up paying after 
financial grants (but not loans that have to be repaid) are deducted from 
the published sticker price.   
4  Critics argue that these pseudo-taxes have not been approved by the Virginia General Assembly.  
Graph 7 presents the average net price paid by undergraduate students at 
Virginia’s four-year public colleges and universities in 2014-15, the latest 
year for which comparable data are available. The data in Graph 7 shine 
a somewhat different light on tuition and fees. The lowest-cost institution 
in the Commonwealth is the University of Virginia’s College at Wise, 
followed by Norfolk State University and Radford University; the highest-
cost institution is Christopher Newport University, followed by Virginia 
Commonwealth University and the University of Mary Washington. 
Despite having the highest sticker price of any public institution in the 
country, William & Mary, on average, charges a net price that places it 
well below the group average of $16,312.      
The net price data provided in Graph 7 make it clear that every institution 
is providing significant need-based grants to its students. Has this aid been 
sufficient to compensate students and their families for the tuition and fee 
increases that have been imposed? The simple answer is no and this is not 
a disputed judgment, either in Virginia or nationally. The Appropriations 
Committee of the Virginia House of Delegates found that the state-
funded financial aid grant per student increased by 75 percent at the 
Commonwealth’s four-year public institutions between 2003 and 2015, 
but tuition and fees increased an average of 170 percent.
Nationally, the College Board, a nonprofit organization representing more 
than 6,000 colleges and universities, reported that even after accounting 
for all financial grants received by students at public colleges and 
universities, the real, price-adjusted costs paid by these students rose by 
a total of 65.4 percent between 2000-01 and 2016-17. This translates to a 
compound growth rate of 3.2 percent annually – after inflation.  
Nevertheless, there is considerable variation among institutions where 
net prices are concerned. Institutions with larger endowments typically 
provide larger financial grants to students that need not be repaid, 
though the impact of these grants is reduced because their tuition and fee 
charges are higher as well. Also, as noted above, some institutions are very 
aggressive price discriminators – they charge different students different 
net prices, usually based upon their residence (in-state versus out-of-
state) and their family incomes (upper-income students pay much higher 
net prices than lower-income students).     
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GRAPH 7
AVERAGE NET PRICE OF ATTENDANCE AT VIRGINIA’S 
FOUR-YEAR PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, 2014-15
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The Economic And 
Social Stratification 
Of Student Bodies
An institution cannot charge premium prices to out-of-state students or to 
wealthier in-state students unless it enjoys brand magnetism that enables 
it to do so. As time passes, the pricing and financial aid policies of each 
institution mold the composition of its student body.  
In January 2017, The New York Times published revealing data for more 
than 2,000 institutions that disclosed the percentage of each institution’s 
student body that came from the upper 1 percent and the lower 60 percent 
of the income distribution of the United States. Table 1 reports these data 
for a selection of colleges and universities in Virginia. The stratification 
of Virginia institutions on the basis of family incomes (and presumably 
wealth as well) is immediately apparent. Almost one in every five 
undergraduate students at Washington and Lee University came from a 
family in the upper 1 percent of the national income distribution, whereas 
at Old Dominion University and Patrick Henry Community College (to 
name only two), less than 1 percent of the undergraduate student body 
emanated from such families.  
Only one in 12 undergraduate students at W&L came from the bottom 
60 percent of the income distribution, but approximately two-thirds 
did so at Norfolk State. If the denizens of the bottom 60 percent of the 
income distribution can be fashioned as “common people,” then one might 
say that at least five Virginia public institutions (University of Virginia, 
William & Mary, Virginia Tech, University of Mary Washington and 
Christopher Newport University) have relatively few common people in 
their undergraduate student bodies.
One measure of the accessibility of a college or university to students 
coming from lower-income families is the percentage of Pell Grant 
students that institution enrolls. It is evident in Table 2 that Virginia 
institutions in general enroll smaller percentages of undergraduates who 
receive Pell Grants (26 percent) than the national average (approximately 
39 percent). This reflects two major factors: (1) Virginia incomes are 
higher than the national average5 and hence fewer Virginians qualify for 
Pell Grants; and (2) tuition and fees at Virginia institutions are higher 
than the national average. The $5,810 annual cap on Pell Grants means 
that the student bodies composed of those students who can afford to 
attend are weighted a bit more heavily toward upper-income students and 
families.  
The College of William & Mary’s 11 percent Pell Grant percentage for 
its undergraduate student body was the lowest of any public college or 
university in the United States and the University of Virginia’s 12 percent 
was not far behind. Prima facie, neither institution is very accessible to 
student applicants from lower-income families. Additions to this list might 
include James Madison, Christopher Newport, Virginia Tech and Mary 
Washington. One could question whether this is consistent with their 
status as public institutions serving the entire citizenry. 
In defense of several of these institutions (and especially W&M), they 
do provide generous need-based financial grants to students who come 
to them from lower-income families. Table 3 provides the average net 
price paid by students who came to these institutions from households 
with incomes that were $30,000 or below. These students nearly always 
qualified for a Pell Grant, but typically required substantial additional 
financial aid to be able to attend.  
William & Mary’s generously low $4,459 net price for students from 
households with incomes of $30,000 or less stands out. Clearly, W&M 
has made the provision of grant-based financial aid to its lowest-income 
students a very high priority. We know of only one other institution, the 
University of Michigan, which offers its lowest-income students a lower 
net price ($2,660). The University of Virginia also deserves kudos for 
lowering the net price paid by its lowest-income students by more than 
$600 between 2014-15 and 2015-16.
5   The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis reports that the 2015 national median household income was $56,516, 
while the comparable Virginia number was $61,086.
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TABLE 1








Washington and Lee 19.1% 8.4%
U Richmond 15.1% 20.6%
U Virginia 8.5% 15.0%
William & Mary 6.5% 12.1%
Hampden Sydney C 6.1% 22.3%
U Mary Washington 2.9% 17.6%
Virginia Tech 2.8% 15.0%
James Madison U 2.6% 12.6%
Christopher Newport U 1.7% 18.1%
George Mason U 1.5% 26.2%
Radford U <1% 26.4%
Va Commonwealth U < 1% 31.0%
Old Dominion U < 1% 33.2%
Northern Va CC <1% 42.3%
Liberty U <1% 43.4%
Blue Ridge CC <1% 50.9%
Thomas Nelson CC < 1% 52.4%
Norfolk State U < 1% 66.0%
Patrick Henry CC <1% 75.8%
Source: “The Upshot,” The New York Times (Jan. 18, 2017)
TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF ALL UNDERGRADUATES RECEIVING PELL GRANTS 
AT SELECTED VIRGINIA INSTITUTIONS, 2015-16
Washington and Lee U  9%
C of William & Mary 11%
U of Virginia 12%
James Madison U 14%
Virginia Tech 16%
Christopher Newport U 16%
U of Mary Washington 17%





George Mason U 27%
 Virginia Commonwealth U 28%
Dabney Lancaster CC 29%
Radford U 31%
Old Dominion U 37%
National Average 39%
U Virginia Wise 38%
J. Sargeant Reynolds CC 39%
Thomas Nelson CC 42%
Eastern Shore CC 43%
Mountain Empire CC 46%
Liberty U 47%
Norfolk State U 62%
Virginia State U 71%
Source: National Center for Education Statistics’ College Navigator
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TABLE 3
NET PRICES PAID BY STUDENTS COMING TO SELECTED CAMPUSES 
FROM FAMILIES WITH INCOMES $30,000 OR BELOW IN 2015-16
William & Mary $4,459
U of Virginia Wise $9,396
U of Virginia $9,463
Old Dominion U $11,470
Radford U $12,720
Norfolk State U $13,952
Virginia State U $12,998
U of Mary Washington $11,899
James Madison U $12,872
Virginia Tech $11,998
Longwood U $15,786
George Mason U $15,089
Virginia Commonwealth U $13,593
Christopher Newport U $15,500
Source: National Center for Education Statistics’ College Navigator
The problem is that very few lower-income students end up being 
able to take advantage of William & Mary’s generosity. This is true 
for a variety of reasons, including of course W&M’s impressively 
high admission standards. Much the same story might be recited at the 
University of Virginia, though it is not as liberal in providing grant-based 
financial aid to its lowest-income students.   
These episodes inspire intriguing public policy questions. Should Virginia 
subsidize colleges and universities whose pricing of undergraduate 
education to Virginians often imitates private institutions? Is it 
appropriate for the citizenry to subsidize institutions that increase social 
and economic inequality rather than provide the traditional ladders of 
opportunity that diminish differences? These are knotty questions because, 
inter alia, the Top 25 rankings of W&M and UVA depend in part on their 
ability to structure their operations and prices in the fashion just outlined. 
Programs designed to increase the presence of lower-income students at 
these institutions might endanger their coveted rankings if they ended 
up reducing SAT and ACT scores and other metrics, such as graduation 
rates.6  
There are undeniable financial considerations attached to institutional 
admission strategies. Pell Grant students can be expensive to educate 
because they require more institutionally based financial aid and 
augmented campus services. Enrolling additional Pell Grant students 
might reduce the number of slots available for full price out-of-state 
students who pay more than $40,000 in annual tuition at W&M and UVA.  
Rare is the president of a top-ranked institution who wants to preside 
over a noticeable decline in his or her institution’s rankings. What 
member of an institution’s board of visitors will brag about the lower 
national ranking that came about because more Pell Grant students were 
admitted?
Are there other reputable national models available for consideration? 
Yes. At the University of California at Berkeley, for example, 30 
percent of undergraduates were Pell Grant recipients in 2015-16, 
while at UCLA it was 35 percent. Indeed, five University of California 
campuses are ranked among U.S. News & World Report’s Top 25 public 
institutions and each enrolls more Pell Grant students than all but a few 
of Virginia’s four-year public institutions. Further, these institutions offer 
rather low net prices to their lowest-income students – 8,677 at Berkeley 
and $7,900 at UCLA in 2015-16.7     
Georgetown University’s Center on Education and the Workforce 
recently examined Pell Grant enrollments in highly selective colleges 
and universities and concluded “selective colleges can afford to admit 
more Pell Grant recipients.” Anthony Carnevale and Martin Van Der 
Werf of Georgetown recently proposed a “20% Solution” such that the 
undergraduate student bodies of selective institutions should include at 
least 20 percent Pell Grant recipients. The duo argue that the institutions 
can afford to do so and that this “could equalize opportunity in higher 
education.”8  
6   With respect to graduation rates, see Sarah Butrymowicz, “Billions in Pell Dollars Go to Students Who Never 
Graduate,” Hechinger Report (Aug. 17, 2015).  
7  College Navigator.  
8  https://cew.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/The-20-Percent-Solution-web.pdf.
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Ultimately – though institutions often argue otherwise – they are not 
prisoners of history and circumstance. As time passes, colleges and 
universities retain the ability to reshape their financial models and 
student profiles. Several Virginia institutions have done so in recent 
decades (notably James Madison and Christopher Newport), though they 
have moved away from, not toward, the Pell 20 model. Nevertheless, the 
example of the University of California campuses suggests that institutions 
may be able to retain both rankings and reputation even while they 
become more accessible to students from lower-income backgrounds.   
A bipartisan proposal in Congress would assign financial penalties to 
institutions that take the lowest proportions of Pell Grant students.9 At 
least half a dozen Virginia public four-year institutions appear to have 
made strategic decisions that effectively restrict the access of lower-
income Virginians to those campuses. Is this a trend that the citizenry 
should support? We do not have the answer to this question, but it 
is easy to observe that what is perceived to be good for an individual 
institution’s national rankings may not be synonymous with what is good 
for Virginians.
Student Debt
When students and their families cannot afford a Virginia public college 
or university, one of three things happens. They may choose not to attend 
college at all; they may switch from full-time to part-time attendance; or 
they may go into debt by borrowing money to pay their educational costs.  
The State Council of Higher Education for Virginia (SCHEV) collects 
data concerning student debt in the Commonwealth. SCHEV found that 
62 percent of 2015-16 baccalaureate degree graduates borrowed an 
average of $29,822 to pay for their education. The 62 percent debtor 
number for 2015-16 graduates was up from 56 percent for 2006-007 
graduates. SCHEV labels these debts “known” and cautions that its report 
may not capture all debt these graduates incurred.
9   Jon Marcus, “Top Universities Could Take Thousands More Low-Income Students, Study Says,” Hechinger 
Report (May 2, 2017), http://hechingerreport.org/top-universities-take-thousands-low-income-students-
study-says.
TABLE 4
THE GROWTH OF KNOWN STUDENT DEBT INCURRED OF 
BACCALAUREATE DEGREE GRADUATES OF VIRGINIA FOUR-YEAR 
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
Year
Percent of Known 
Debtors
Average Level of Debt
2011-2012 61% $26,407 
2012-2013 62% $27,582 
2013-2014 63% $28,322 
2014-2015 63% $29,267 
2015-2016 62% $29,822
Source: State Council of Higher Education for Virginia, “Who Borrows and How Much Do They Borrow?” 
http://research.schev.edu/apps/info/Articles.Student-Debt-A-First-Look-at-Graduate-Debt.ashx
TABLE 5
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF COLLEGE STUDENT DEBT
Those who have significant student debt are:
• Less likely to buy a home (New York Fed, 2013)
• Less likely to start a new business (Philadelphia Fed, 2015)
• More likely to live with their parents (Fed’s Board of Governors, 2015)
• Less likely to save for their retirements (Brookings, 2014)
• More likely to have negative household wealth (Armantier, 2016)
• More likely to have an inferior credit rating score (New York Fed, 2013)
Sources: Noted above
Student debt changes lives and alters behavior. Table 5 summarizes a 
variety of unhappy aftereffects attached to student debt. It will suffice 
for us to observe that rising levels of student debt do not constitute a 
recipe for bringing Virginia out of its economic growth doldrums.  
Student debt owed to the U.S. government (more than 80 percent of all 
student debt) is nondischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding. 
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This means that federal student debt follows former students for the 
remainder of their lives and cannot be avoided unless they qualify for a 
limited number of federal debt forgiveness programs. In 2016, no payments 
were being made on almost half of all federal student debt accounts and 
11 percent were in serious default (Forbes, April 10, 2016).  
The bottom line is that it is in the best interests of Virginia to graduate 
students who are debt free, or whose debt obligations are small. Rapidly 
rising higher education prices (both “sticker” and “net”) push the 
Commonwealth in the opposite direction.
Why Have Tuition And Fees 
Increased So Rapidly?
Virginia’s higher education institutions argue that their tuition and fee 
increases have been necessary because of reductions in state general fund 
tax support. This assertion is true – but only to a certain point. Between 
1996 and 2015, Virginia cut its real, enrollment-adjusted appropriations 
to its institutions of higher education by about 26 percent.10 Hence, it is 
understandable that the colleges and universities moved to replace this 
revenue with tuition and fee dollars.  
However, a fall 2016 analysis by the staff of the House of Delegates’ 
Appropriations Committee concluded that institutions raised tuition $2 
for every $1 they lost in state appropriations between 1996 and 2015 
(see Graph 8).11 Thus, Virginia’s public colleges and universities have 
been increasing tuition for other reasons as well. This conclusion is 
consistent with recent national studies.12  
10   “Higher Education Affordability,” House Appropriations Committee Retreat, Nov. 15-16, 2016, http://hac.
virginia.gov/committee/files/2016/11-15-16/III%20-%20Higher%20Education%20Affordability.pdf.
11   “Higher Education Affordability,” House Appropriations Committee Retreat, Nov. 15-16, 2016, http://hac.
virginia.gov/committee/files/2016/11-15-16/III%20-%20Higher%20Education%20Affordability.pdf.
12   One example is Neal McCluskey, “Not Just Treading Water,” Policy Analysis (Cato Institute, Feb. 15, 2017).  
What are those other reasons? They include: 
•  Institutional concern with national rankings is epitomized by U.S. News 
& World Report rankings. Fixation on rankings can lead to a variety of 
decisions considerably divorced from the needs of taxpayers, students 
and families.
•  Inter-institutional amenities competition stimulates institutions to offer 
such things as recreational spas and climbing walls as well as upscale 
(and expensive) food services. 
•  Institutions often construct new, spacious buildings even though 
it is costly to maintain this space and their use of existing space 
is surprisingly low. A 2014 study by the State Council of Higher 
Education for Virginia disclosed that no residential four-year campus 
in the Commonwealth utilized its classrooms more than 76 percent 
of reasonably available hours, and three campuses ranged below 60 
percent usage.  Parenthetically, it is not clear that adding significant 
new space is an intelligent public policy when internet-based instruction 
is expanding and headcount enrollments are declining. Modernization 
and rehabilitation of existing space may make more sense and be less 
expensive.
•  Institutions increasingly assess mandatory fees to support items ranging 
from student centers to athletic teams. In 2016-17, eight Virginia four-
year public institutions charged their full-time undergraduate students 
athletic fees of $1,538 or more. Consider Christopher Newport’s $1,886 
annual fee. This corresponds to a charge of $188.60 per three-hour 
undergraduate course. Doubtless CNU’s Captains are well regarded, but 
they also are expensive and students bear a substantial portion of that 
cost.    
•  The growth of institutional room and board charges at most Virginia 
institutions easily has exceeded the growth of the consumer price index 
(see Graph 9). First-rate residence halls and excellent food are pleasing, 
but costly. 
•  Administrative proliferation (as measured by the number of 
administrators per faculty member or student) exists on most campuses. 
Further, these administrators tend to be paid well.
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GRAPH 8
STATE GENERAL FUND APPROPRIATIONS TO PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA PER IN-STATE FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT STUDENT 
COMPARED TO TUITION AND FEES AND THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, 1996-2015
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•  Institutions have reduced the proportion of their budgets they spend on 
instruction (see Graph 10).  
•  Disproportionate growth in spending on employee fringe benefits (which 
sometimes have substituted for pay raises during difficult years) has 
pushed tuition and fees upward.   
•  Federal government financial aid policies are based upon institutional 
costs. Hence, when institutional costs increase, the “feds” supply more 
money. 
•  Institutions are reluctant to take advantage of new teaching and 
learning technologies, flipped classrooms and other innovations that have 
the potential to scale higher education.    
•  Institutions are disinclined to share resources with other institutions, 
even in low-enrollment areas such as foreign languages and literatures.
•  Institutions are averse to pricing the resources they use internally, such 
as space, and this leads to suboptimal behavior and hoarding.   
•  Institutional mission creep has propelled many institutions into offering 
new, low-enrollment programs, often at the graduate level.
•  Faculty productivity, as measured by faculty credit hours generated, has 
declined on most campuses. 
•  Subsidies from undergraduate students often are required to support 
faculty research activity and this is true even in cases where the 
research also is supported by outside grants.    
This is an extensive list and one should understand that the application 
of these factors often varies substantially from one campus to another. 
Nowhere is this truer than in Virginia, where institutional independence is 
relatively high compared to many other states, not the least because each 
institution has its own board of visitors. Collectively, these are among the 
primary reasons why tuition and fee increases at Virginia’s public colleges 
and universities not only have vastly exceeded the growth in the consumer 
price index and median household income, but also why they have been 
substantially higher than the national average.
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GRAPH 9
COMPARING CHANGES IN THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE COST OF ATTENDANCE  
AT VIRGINIA PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS TO CHANGES IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, 1996-2015
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GRAPH 10
COMPARING MAJOR EXPENSE CATEGORY SPENDING AT VIRGINIA PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, 1996 AND 2015








































































Would Legislative Rules 
Constraining Tuition And 
Fee Increases Make 
A Difference?
If tuition and fee increases have been too large, then would rules imposed 
either by the Virginia General Assembly or the State Council of Higher 
Education for Virginia constrain increases and improve the situation? 
Perhaps.  
Let’s utilize an example to clarify the situation. Graph 11 compares the 
University of Virginia’s annual tuition and fee increases to three-year 
rolling averages of changes in the consumer price index (CPI) and median 
Virginia household income. After recording zero or even negative tuition 
and fee increases in the first years of this century, in 14 of 15 subsequent 
years, UVA’s tuition and fee increases exceeded the three-year rolling 
average rates of growth in both the CPI and Virginia median household 
income. 
If UVA had been restricted to tuition and fee increases that were equal 
to the rolling three-year average growth of the CPI, then this would have 
cut approximately 61 percent from UVA’s per student in-state tuition and 
fee charge in 2016-17. Specifically, UVA’s published tuition and fee price in 
2016-17 was $15,714. If instead, between 2001-02 and 2016-17, UVA had 
increased its tuition and fees only at the rolling three-year average rate of 
growth in the CPI,13 then in 2016-17 its tuition and fee charge would have 
been only $6,047 – 38.5 percent of the actual cost.
One can approximate the total cost of this higher tuition strategy to 
Virginia undergraduates. SCHEV reports that UVA enrolled 16,631 
undergraduate students in fall 2016, of which approximately 66 percent, 
or 10,976, were Virginians. If these 10,976 Virginians had paid $6,047 in 
tuition and fees rather than the actual $15,714 in 2016-17, then collectively 
in that year alone they would have saved $106.11 million – a rather tidy 
13  July to July of each year.
sum. In effect, by assessing tuition and fee increases in excess of the 
growth in the CPI, UVA reallocated an estimated $106.11 million from 
Virginia students and their families to whatever alternative purposes the 
university valued more highly.14  
Cumulatively, over the 15-year period 2001-02 through 2016-17, the tuition 
and fees UVA charged its in-state undergraduates totaled $721.38 million 
more than what those charges would have been had their increases been 
limited to the previous year’s growth in the CPI.  
Many readers are aware even while these tuition increases were being 
imposed, UVA was accumulating a $2 billion-plus discretionary fund. 
The university did so legally. Choice-making, however, is an intrinsic, 
unavoidable part of the exercise of leadership. This particular set of 
choices invites questions. Might not UVA have used some of the 
$2 billion-plus it accumulated to lower the tuition and fees assessed 
Virginia students at the university? Could not more modest tuition and fee 
increases have been imposed on in-state undergraduates that would have 
reduced the $721.38 million estimate previously noted? Ultimately, such 
decisions reflect the values held by the senior officers of institutions and 
their board members.    
The point here is not that UVA misused the $721.38 million (or the 
$2 billion-plus fund), but instead that as economists point out, there were 
real opportunity costs – foregone alternatives – attached to this approach 
to managing the institution. Alternatively, perhaps more spartan ways 
to operate the institution existed instead of UVA choosing to impose the 
equivalent of a 61 percent excise tax on Virginia students and families.  
Would a low-tuition policy have done damage to UVA’s rankings and its 
ability to accomplish its stated institutional goals? Quite possibly, given 
the fashion in which rankings usually are assigned. This is an important 
reason why our discussion here will not lead to a definitive conclusion. The 
goal of this chapter has been to highlight affordability and access issues 
and the costs associated with current tuition and fee regimens, not to 
14   We assume that 66 percent of the undergraduate students in each year would qualify for in-state tuition 
and fees. Note that one use of the $106.11 million by UVA was to provide additional financial aid to its 
undergraduates. Hence, some students received back some of the proceeds of the putative excise tax that 
all paid.   
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prescribe an operating plan for any Virginia public institution, including 
UVA.   
Lest anyone view tuition and fee rules such as the one we have 
just illustrated for the CPI as a panacea, we point out that skillful 
administrators likely could find a variety of ways around any restrictive 
rule legislators might devise. For example, they might choose instead to 
impose discipline-specific surcharges (for example, charging engineering 
students higher tuition) to sidestep an overall tuition cap. Or, they 
might impose user fees on many campus services previously free or low-
priced. They might also raise room and board charges and then assess a 
larger administrative fee to their residence hall operations (or any other 
auxiliary enterprise) for central services provided.  
One could go on, but the implications are clear: Regulatory authorities 
nearly always must struggle to impose their wills on those they regulate. 
Human imagination seemingly is infinite and those who are regulated are 
adept at finding new ways to circumvent what initially might appear to be 
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Is “Free” Tuition A Solution?
Considerable attention nationally has been focused on proposals for 
“free” tuition. Tennessee led the way in this regard for adult community 
college students and political candidates in both parties have picked up 
free tuition as a popular campaign plank. The notion has simple appeal 
– simply abolish tuition at public institutions, or at least at community 
colleges.
Alas, this is a notion that does not survive careful analysis. First, at most 
community colleges, large numbers of students pay little or no tuition 
already because of the need-based financial aid they receive. Hence, 
free tuition ends up supporting large numbers of students who have no 
demonstrated financial need. This represents a questionable redistribution 
of income and use of public funds.  
Second, place yourself in the role of a college president who has just 
been informed that henceforth the state will cover tuition costs for her 
students. What incentive does she now have to control costs? Little or 
none. Free tuition fails to address an obvious problem in public higher 
education – rampant cost inflation. On the contrary, it accentuates the 
difficulty.
Third, if institutions no longer collect tuition from many students, 
then they will become heavily dependent upon state appropriations. 
Unfortunately, state general fund support is highly variable and on a per-
student basis has declined substantially over past decades. Institutions 
would find themselves dealing with highly cyclical finances.    
Free tuition is a Band-Aid solution to the much more deep-seated problem 
of public college price inflation. It does not respond to the forces that have 
generated our current challenges.  
Governors, Boards Of 
Visitors And The General 
Assembly Are Crucial
University administrators cannot increase published tuition and fee 
charges on their own. Their recommendations in this arena must be 
approved by their boards of visitors, whose members are appointed by the 
governor. One can cut to the chase by observing that many, perhaps most, 
members of the boards of Virginia colleges and universities come to believe 
that their primary responsibility is to their institution (and by extension, 
perhaps its president) rather than to taxpayers, citizens and students.    
Gradually, significant numbers of board members end up being co-opted 
by their university’s president and senior administrators, who treat them 
well, shower them with attention and present them with almost uniformly 
positive news about their institution. If basic institutional “dashboard” 
variables (enrollment, fundraising, rankings) appear to be in order, 
then most board members tend to defer to their president and senior 
administrators when they receive proposals from them (including tuition 
and fee increases). Discussions concerning accessibility and affordability 
periodically arise at some meetings, but they are matters that nearly 
always receive less attention than items relating to new buildings and 
academic programs.  
Lunches and dinners during board meetings are filled with the likes 
of Fulbright Scholar faculty members, those who have garnered large 
research grants, string quartets and jazz groups, students who have been 
admitted to prestigious graduate schools, and members of the campus 
community who are local incarnations of Mother Teresa. When combined 
with tickets to an enticing football or basketball game, these amenities 
form a seductive mixture that subtly discourages probing questions that 
might disrupt the flow. Indeed, board members who delve too deeply, or 
who venture into the uncomfortable territory of affordability and access, 
may find themselves being counseled by senior board members and advised 
to stick to the agenda and avoid being contentious.    
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Given this environment, what if future Virginia governors were to choose 
to appoint to boards of visitors only those individuals who view citizens, 
taxpayers and students as their primary constituency and concern? What 
if future Virginia public college and university presidents were evaluated 
on the basis of the access and affordability of their institutions in addition 
to the usual dashboard metrics? What if future administrative salary 
increments were to reflect this reorientation?  
The answers are that we would soon observe different behavior by 
administrators and see more modest tuition and fee increases. The current 
system is fixable, but only if governors, legislators and board members 
understand what has been going on and how the game is played on 
campus. It will take definitive action by future governors, legislators and 
board members for the Commonwealth to pull itself out of the current rut.  
The General Assembly has a significant role to play in terms of the 
incentives it implants in the budgets it passes. Why should institutions 
that have been circumspect in their tuition and fee increases receive 
the same budgetary treatment as those that have implemented large 
increases?15 Legislators can and should ask significant questions of 
prospective board of visitors nominees concerning their approach to their 
duties. Future board members, as a condition of their service, should be 
required to undertake significant orientation activities that address many 
of the issues covered in this chapter as a condition of their appointments.    
The accumulated evidence suggests that it is time to move in different 
directions in public higher education in Virginia. If we opt to do so, then 
the rewards will be higher economic growth rates and, some might argue, 
a more equitable society that emphasizes the opening of opportunities 
rather than the closing of doors.  
15   Old Dominion University provides an instructive example. As Graph 1 reveals, ODU’s tuition and fee 
increases have been the lowest in Virginia among four-year institutions and Business Insider named the 
institution the “most affordable” four-year public institution in Virginia. It enrolls large percentages of 
financially needy students who aspire to social and economic mobility. Its reward has been visibly lower 
per student general fund financial support (compared to other doctoral institutions). Restraint has been 
penalized.





he notion that unified regional 
governments in Virginia’s metropolitan 
areas might improve our lot has been 
around for a long time. After all, it is not 
heretical to assume that economic and political 
benefits could accrue if we pursued regional 
governance and consolidated the provision of 
many public services.
The economic arguments in favor of 
regionalization focus on a factual reality and 
a supposition. First, the weight of economic 
empirical evidence tells us that public services, 
ranging from water supply to libraries, exhibit 
significant economies of scale.1 Large size 
lowers unit costs and, on occasion, can increase 
the quality of output as well. Of course, there 
are always exceptions to the rule and not all 
public services enjoy economies of scale.
Second, the supposition is that businesses 
prefer to locate in regions that “have their 
act together” (the observation of a Virginia 
corporate executive). Firms and organizations 
understandably prefer the certainty of dealing 
with a minimum number of governmental 
entities. While businesses may not always be 
thrilled with what these governmental entities 
do, they know what buttons to push. It is 
certainly not a stretch to argue that businesses 
can save money if they don’t have to interact 
with a large number of governmental entities.   
In the political realm, deservedly or not, cities 
and counties in several areas of Virginia have 
acquired reputations for pushing multiple, 
1   Alesch, Daniel J., and L.A. Dougharty. The Feasibility of Economies-
of-Scale Analysis of Public Services. Rand, 1971.
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competing legislative agendas. The absence of clear regional priorities and 
direction affects the ability of other state and national representatives 
to bring home the proverbial legislative bacon. It seems plausible that 
more might be accomplished if the cities and counties were all rowing in 
the same direction. Unified regional governmental units arguably might 
help in not only coordinating legislative action, but also in attracting new 
businesses and dealing with challenges such as climate change. 
The most obvious example of large-scale regional government is New York 
City, with its more than 8.5 million residents spread across five boroughs. 
Since 1898, the boroughs have been united in one city government. The 
consolidation of the boroughs not only created a unifying government, 
but also allowed each borough to retain some aspects of local authority. 
The borough-city relationship in New York mirrors the state-national 
federalism of the United States. Virtually all agree, however, that the 
borough of Manhattan is primarily a location, and New York City is both a 
location and the ultimately responsible governmental unit.  
It is not a stretch to assert that many of the things we prominently 
associate with New York City today – the United Nations, numerous 
Fortune 500 company headquarters and superb cultural attractions, such 
the Metropolitan Museum of Art – would exist in the metropolitan area 
only in diminished form, or not at all, if five or more separate cities existed 
rather than one unified city. Witness the city of Richmond and Henrico 
and Chesterfield counties, or the seven major cities of Hampton Roads, 
as they wrestle over matters small and large, including entertainment 
venues, outlet malls, economic development agencies, vehicle tolls and the 
like.    
At the same time, however, it also is true that New York City 
simultaneously has developed a reputation for supporting a large, 
expensive and bureaucratic government. Further, some major 
infrastructure and institutions do not seem to work well (consider 
LaGuardia Airport and the subway system). The Big Apple also generates 
very large levels of economic inequality.2 It appears that ledgers with 




Interest in regional government and the consolidation of public services 
has waxed and waned over the years in Virginia. Appendix A lists some of 
the successful and unsuccessful annexation attempts by Virginia cities in 
the last century. Richmond’s acquisition of Manchester in 1910, Newport 
News’ addition of Warwick in 1958 and Christiansburg’s addition of 
Cambria in 1964 are among the successful acquisitions. The list of failures 
is long, however, and includes rejected annexation attempts by Winchester 
in 1969, Charlottesville in 1970 and Roanoke in 1990.   
In 1980, the Commonwealth reacted to pressures from those opposed to 
annexations and approved regulations that permitted counties with larger 
populations and greater population density to immunize themselves from 
annexation proposals. Chesterfield, Henrico, Henry, Prince William, 
Roanoke and York counties immediately benefitted from this legislation. 
Virginia also granted partial protection to counties that already provided 
public services similar to those of adjoining cities anxious to annex 
them. In 1987, the General Assembly imposed a “temporary” ban on 
annexations of county lands by cities that remains in effect to this day.  
Each of the preceding developments is consistent with Virginia’s status 
as a Dillon Rule state. The foundation of the Dillon Rule is a distrust of 
the motivations and competence of local governments. Virginia’s Supreme 
Court adopted the Dillon Rule in 1896 via City of Winchester v. Redmond, 
and has concluded that local governments in Virginia only have powers 
that are conferred upon them by the General Assembly, and that these 
powers must be explicitly defined and related to the core functions of 
Since 1980, Virginia law has authorized local circuit courts to grant 
counties immunity from any annexation by a city if they satisfied certain 
population and population density requirements: a population of 50,000 
and a density of 140 residents per square mile; or, a population of 20,000 
and a density of 300 residents per square mile. Practically speaking, 
these standards virtually eliminate annexations in urban areas.
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local governments.3 Figure 1 brings these restrictions to life in the realm 
of annexations by means of the example of the city of Norfolk. Between 
1845 and 1959, Norfolk’s physical size expanded as the result of five major 
annexations, including the areas encompassing the largest naval base in 
the world and the region’s major airport. Annexations halted, however, in 
1959 with the creation of the cities of Virginia Beach and Chesapeake and 
subsequent changes in state laws in the 1970s and 1980s. Norfolk today is 
an enclosed city for which no opportunities for further annexation exist. 
The same circumstance effectively applies to other Virginia cities such as 
Alexandria, Fairfax, Lynchburg, Richmond and Roanoke.
3   Lamb, James C., and Martin P. Burks. “Virginia Reports. Reports of Cases in the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia.” The Virginia Law Register 93 (1897): 711-18. doi:10.2307/1097665.
FIGURE 1
ANNEXATION BY NORFOLK, 1845-1959: 
AN EXAMPLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT CHANGES IN HAMPTON ROADS
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GO Virginia And 
Regionalization
Imitating Old Faithful, approximately once per decade in Virginia, interest 
in regional solutions to governance and service provision rekindles and 
groups are formed to encourage regional solutions to problems and issues. 
The current GO Virginia initiative – with its statewide brief – follows in 
this tradition (http://www.govirginia.org). In 2016, the General Assembly 
allocated $27 million to GO Virginia to encourage regional collaboration, 
with a primary focus on making the Commonwealth’s regions more 
attractive to current and prospective businesses.  
The emergence of GO Virginia must be considered in the context of the 
Joint Legislative Audit and Review Committee’s widely cited November 
2016 report, which eviscerated the performance of the Virginia Economic 
Development Partnership.4 This highly critical review of the Partnership’s 
operations generated a set of changes: a new Partnership director, a 
reorganization and a reduced budget. It also stoked political support for 
alternatives, such as GO Virginia.
GO Virginia is a more focused approach to economic development that 
simultaneously spurs regional cooperation. Axiomatically, legislators 
usually like programs that promise the return of state dollars to their 
districts, and GO Virginia promises to do just that. Politically, GO Virginia 
also provided both the executive and legislative branches with a valuable 
opportunity to stand clear of the documented failures of the Virginia 
Economic Development Partnership.   
Public-spirited efforts with a regional accent, such as GO Virginia, 
usually attract the support of major corporations, corporate leaders 
and cognoscenti because they appeal to virtues that many citizens hold 
dear, such as cooperation, elimination of duplication and the promotion 
of economic growth. It is not surprising that the consensus view in the 
Commonwealth is that GO Virginia represents a new, more productive 
4   Joint Legislative and Review Committee, Management and Accountability of the Virginia Economic 
Development Partnership (November 2016), http://jlarc.virginia.gov/vedp-2016.asp.
path to travel. The proponents of GO Virginia include nearly every 
organization of significance in the Commonwealth.  
There are other views, however. Less charitable pundits view GO Virginia 
as a new publicly financed Christmas tree around which ambitious cities, 
businesses and universities will gather to pluck gifts. Thus, many of 
Virginia’s largest businesses will partner with universities, new firms 
and governmental units to grab a share of the goodies. Universities will 
perceive these funds as a viable way to offset the general fund cuts and 
as a funding source for construction of new research and development 
facilities. Surely, none of these developments is necessarily a bad thing, but 
such processes may not result in the highest and best use of the funds.5
5   See the website Bearing Drift, “Stealth Regionalism Quietly Makes Headway on the Coattails of GO Virginia,” 
Part One (May 10, 2017) and Part Two (May 23, 2017), https://bearingdrift.com.
GO Virginia is governed by a 24-member statewide board that oversees 
nine regional boards, each of which may submit programmatic and 
funding proposals to the statewide board.  The regions vary substantially 
in terms of population – about 400,000 to 2.5 million – and do not 
reflect the geography of already established planning districts. GO 
Virginia is not a part of the executive branch, but instead reports to the 
General Assembly. Nor does the State Council for Higher Education in 
Virginia appear to have any specific authority relating to the activities of 
public colleges and universities funded by GO Virginia. Yet to be clearly 
established is who will evaluate GO Virginia performance, or how and 
when this will occur.  
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Megaregions?
This United States has been rapidly urbanizing in recent decades. In 2015, 
the Census Bureau reported that 62.7 percent of all Americans reside 
in only 3.5 percent of the nation’s land area.6 Most of these inhabitants 
live in “megaregions,” consisting of overlapping metropolitan areas that 
once were separate and distinct. Witness the expansion of the Baltimore-
Washington, D.C., agglomeration, which now stretches south to within 50 
miles of Richmond and north to the Delaware border.
Thinking in terms of megaregions, some contend, is entirely rational 
because these entities are meaningful, interdependent economic units 
that overlay city, county and state boundaries. Individuals commute to 
Washington, D.C., from all directions, including West Virginia, Maryland 
and Virginia. In Chicago, the market for commuters and customers 
stretches from Wisconsin through Illinois to Indiana. The salient point is 
that “old” geographic and political boundaries do not constrain economic 
activity or social intercourse, and megaregions roughly define the most 
critical economic and social interconnections.  
Megaregions are defined by the behavior of workers and customers 
rather than conventional geographic boundaries.
As Parag Khanna, a global strategist and author, argued in The New York 
Times (“A New Map for America,” April 15, 2016): 
“Increasingly … socially and economically, America is reorganizing 
itself around regional infrastructure lines and metropolitan 
clusters that ignore state and even national borders. … To an 
extent, America is already headed toward a metropolis-first 
arrangement. The states aren’t about to go away, but economically 
and socially, the country is drifting toward looser metropolitan 
and regional formations, anchored by the great cities and urban 
archipelagos that already lead global economic circuits.” 
Proponents of megaregions estimate that between now and 2050, more 
than two-thirds of the U.S. population growth and economic growth will 
6  www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/cb15-33.html.
occur in megaregions. A September 2005 Global Gateway Report, “The 
United States of America’s 3rd Century Strategy: Preserving the American 
Dream” (Regional Plan Association, 2005), proposed:
“As the number of economically competitive regions grows around 
the world, America’s cities need to band together in order to 
strengthen their role in the global economy. … As metropolitan 
regions in the United States grow together, many diseconomies 
have emerged, such as congestion in transportation networks which 
affect the economic vitality and quality of life of these regions. The 
megaregion model is based upon the idea that if the cities in these 
colliding regions work together they can create a new urban form 
that will increase economic opportunity and global competitiveness 
for each individual city and for the nation.”
America 20507 has identified 10 megaregions expected to emerge over the 
next several decades. They are depicted in Figure 2 and include a huge 
northeastern megaregion that extends from Boston to Northern Virginia. 
Note that the Richmond-Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News axis is 
not included on this list and Richmond’s leadership appears to be more 
interested in pursuing connections with Northern Virginia than with 
Hampton Roads.
7   America 2050 is the Regional Plan Association’s national infrastructure planning and policy program, 
providing leadership on a broad range of transportation, sustainability and economic-development issues 
impacting America’s growth in the 21st century.
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FIGURE 2
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Richmond And Hampton 
Roads: Are There Arguments 
For A Megaregion? 
Practically speaking, regional and megaregional cooperation will occur 
only if citizens and leaders opt for collaboration rather than competition. 
This is much easier said than done. Candidates running for office in 
Fairfax County receive zero votes from residents of Loudoun County and 
so their political future is not tied to regionalism. The legendary Tip 
O’Neill, speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1977-1987, was 
substantially on target when he commented that, ultimately, “all politics is 
local.” 
Nevertheless, many modern governmental problems and their solutions 
overlap political boundaries and metropolitan regions. Transportation 
issues frequently exemplify this situation. If widening I-81 is a good idea 
(and few who travel it consistently would say otherwise), then multiple 
regions and states must be involved in planning such a development and 
pushing it to conclusion because the highway travels through dozens of 
counties and cities and several states. Political boundaries begin to blur in 
such situations.  
Finding common ground is the key to any uncoerced agreement. The 
most attractive common ground for voters and elected officials is 
identifiable financial gains. This can come in the form of reduced costs 
or improved service. Prospective multiregion gains are possible (though 
hardly guaranteed) if cities, counties and regions cooperate not only on 
transportation projects, but also in areas such as sanitation and health, 
the environment, job training, cultural amenities, higher education and 
the ability to attract businesses large and small. A side benefit is that 
joint approaches often also generate the raw political clout that translates 
larger size and population into more favorable governmental treatment at 
the state and federal levels.  
The notion that a megaregion approach to many issues would be 
advantageous is not a new one. Thomas R. Frantz, of the Williams Mullen 
law firm, was involved in discussions in the early 2000s with business 
leaders of Hampton Roads and Richmond concerning the possibility of 
merging the two metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) to create one 
megaregion from Hampton Roads to Richmond. Frantz wrote in the 
Richmond Times-Dispatch in June 2012:
“As the competition to attract economic development becomes 
greater and more global, many localities are finding short-term 
financial incentives are not enough. A solid infrastructure, plentiful 
amenities and the ability for people and businesses to connect with 
one another and to the outside world must also be present. Cities 
that want to compete nationally and internationally are blurring 
boundaries, combining their assets and resources, and redefining 
themselves through alliances with other nearby cities to become 
more attractive.”
In an article in Virginia Business magazine, Frantz explained further what 
he was proposing:
“We’re not talking about merging cities, counties, fire departments. 
We’re not talking about combining governments or even merging 
economic development authorities. All we’re talking about is to 
enhance the way we hold ourselves out to the world as a combined 
mid-Atlantic gateway.”
A Richmond-based regional think tank, Richmond Future, led by former 
Virginia Commonwealth University president Eugene P. Trani, has 
researched the central Virginia region and assessed the future of the 
capital city and the surrounding area. While the group has not formally 
adopted a resolution supporting the megaregion approach, it did say the 
following in a report printed in the Richmond Times-Dispatch on Feb. 21, 
2016:
“The interests that our region shared with Hampton Roads around 
the Port of Richmond and Route 460 became far clearer to see, 
with some even envisioning the potential formation of a ‘mega-
region’ in which the economic and transportation planning would 
enhance our common interests in a globally integrated economy.”
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The contributors to “Megaregions: Planning for Global Competitiveness” 
(Catherine Ross, ed., Island Press, 2009) concluded: 
“Megaregions offer flexible frameworks to harmonize 
transportation with quality of life, economic opportunity, and 
environmental sustainability. Megaregions are the infrastructure 
and economic footprint in the global economy. Megaregions 
provide a sustainable future through multi-scalar, cross-boundary 
solutions. Megaregions allow us to think globally, coordinate 
regionally and act locally.”
This is grand rhetoric. Not yet demonstrated, however, are answers to two 
critical questions: (1) Can economic and political benefits really be realized 
by acting together, or are the differences between areas such as Hampton 
Roads and Richmond, or Richmond and Northern Virginia, so large 
that they cannot be overcome? (2) If the benefits do exist, will the body 
politic, especially the Dillon Rule-protective General Assembly, permit 
cooperative megaregion behavior to develop and flourish?  
Are We On Our Way To A 
Richmond-Hampton Roads 
Megaregion?
Table 1 reveals that while the Richmond-area MSA is physically larger 
(4,576.3 square miles) than the Hampton Roads MSA (2,682.9 square 
miles), the population of the Hampton Roads region is larger (1,726,907 
to 1,281,708). The greater density of the population in Hampton Roads is 
reflected in the transportation issues discussed subsequently. Likewise, 
the nominal gross domestic product of Hampton Roads exceeds that of 
Richmond ($92.8 billion compared to $80.7 billion).
What would be the economic size of a combined Richmond-Hampton 
Roads megaregion? Table 2 tells us that it would rank as the 20th-largest 
metropolitan economy in the country. Clearly, a metropolitan region of this 
size would be sufficient to attract a major airport and other transportation
TABLE 1
COMPARING THE RICHMOND AND HAMPTON ROADS MSAS (2016)
Characteristic Richmond MSA Hampton Roads MSA












Civilian Labor Force 669,033 831,056
Per Capita Personal 
Income*
$50,460 46,400
Personal Income* $64,151,580,000 $80,033,527,000




*Most recent data from 2015 (U.S. Census) 
Sources: Virginia Economic Development Partnership, Virginia Employment Commission, U.S. Census Bureau 
and Bureau of Economic Analysis
accouterments if, of course, the citizens of the new megaregion could agree 
upon its location.  
Does the theoretical concept of a Richmond-Hampton Roads megaregion 
represent reality insofar as work patterns and connections are concerned? 
Not quite yet, as Figure 3 reveals. However, we can see in Table 4 that 
a substantial number of workers do make the trek between the two 
metropolitan areas. Of the top 10 out-of-metro cities and counties to 
which residents of Richmond commuted in 2014, five were in Hampton 
Roads: Virginia Beach, Norfolk, Newport News, James City County and 
Chesapeake, in that order of magnitude. This involved 20,834 workers. 
Additionally, of the top 10 out-of-metro locations from which Richmond 
workers commuted, five were in Hampton Roads: the cities of Virginia 
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Beach, Newport News, Norfolk, Chesapeake and Hampton, in that order. 
This flow involved 22,595 workers. The total “in and out” flow of workers 
in the Richmond metro constituted 6.49 percent of the labor force and the 
total flow in both directions was 43,429.
Of the top 10 out-of-metro cities and counties to which residents of 
Hampton Roads commuted in 2014, four were in the Richmond area: 
Henrico, Chesterfield and Hanover counties, and the city of Richmond. 
This flow involved 27,007 individuals. Of the top 10 out-of-metro sites 
from which workers in Hampton Roads commuted, three were in the 
Richmond area: Richmond and the counties of Chesterfield and Henrico. 
This flow involved 15,916 individuals and the total flow in both directions 
was 42,923.  
To place these numbers in context, consider that in 2016, on average the 
size of the civilian labor force in the Richmond metropolitan area was 
669,033. Hence, 43,429/669,033 = 6.49 percent of that labor force was 
traveling to or from Hampton Roads for work. Insofar as Hampton Roads 
was concerned, 42,923/831,056 = 6.57 percent of that labor force was 
traveling to or from Richmond for work.
If we consider Richmond and Hampton Roads as a unit, then in 
2014, more than 86,000 workers commuted back and forth between 
Richmond and Hampton Roads. This does not a megaregion make, 
but does reveal that economic connections between the two regions are 
greater than some might suspect.  
TABLE 2
REAL GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT (GRP) BY METROPOLITAN AREA, 2010 AND 2016 (CHAINED 2009 DOLLARS)
 GRP 2010 GRP 2016 Nat’l Metro Size Rank
GRP Growth Rate 
(2010-2016)
Baltimore MSA 150,990 164,545 19 8.98%
Charlotte MSA 115,827 140,815 21 21.57%
Cincinnati MSA 105,826 116,071 28 9.68%
Cleveland MSA 104,299 114,492 29 9.77%
Columbus MSA 94,257 114,492 30 21.47%
Denver MSA 151,224 180,446 18 19.32%
Phoenix MSA 178,640 203,253 16 13.78%
Portland MSA 141,374 151,817 20 12.42%
St. Louis MSA 134,051 140,712 22 4.97%
Hampton Roads MSA 81,132 81,363 39 0.28%
Richmond MSA 61,992 69,987 44 12.90%
RICH/HR Combined MSA 143,124 151,350 21 5.75%
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
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FIGURE 3
COMMUTING PATTERNS IN VIRGINIA’S URBAN CRESCENT














Nothing prevents the Richmond and Hampton Roads metropolitan 
areas from marketing themselves as a megaregion and then behaving 
accordingly – for example, developing a super-regional airport midway 
between the two population centers, promoting and accelerating the 
widening of I-64, supporting the development of the Port of Virginia 
(though centered in Hampton Roads, it has one location in Richmond), 
developing a cooperative approach to high-speed rail and cooperating on 
regional-friendly legislation such as GO Virginia.
The federal government’s Office of Planning and Budget is responsible for 
designating megaregions; however, being designated as a megaregion (or 
claiming to be one) yields no automatic benefits. Federal programs focus 
on metropolitan regions such as the Richmond metropolitan region rather 
than megaregions. Ultimately, some minor prestige may attach to the label 
“megaregion,” but no stream of federal funding is tied to that designation. 
Consequently, a megaregion is as a megaregion does. Cooperative, 
forward-looking behavior that recognizes interdependence and the need 
for jointly derived solutions is the operational key.  
What would a megaregion beginning in Baltimore and bending south to 
Hampton Roads look like? Table 4 reports population and gross regional 
product data for the four major components of such a region. In terms of 
GRP, this megaregion would be the third largest in the country, trailing 
only Los Angeles and New York (see Graph 1). Once again, however, one 
must recognize that this designation would be meaningless unless it were 
accompanied by coordinated, collaborative behavior in critical areas, 
such as transportation. Given that such cooperation has proven to be 
difficult inside Virginia (for example, between Richmond and Hampton 
Roads), it is fair to predict that it would be at least as challenging to 
achieve consensus and cooperation across several states and the District of 
Columbia.  
Taking the long view, however, there is little mystery concerning where 
the process of urbanization is leading us. If this chapter is rewritten 25 
years from today, then we could expect it to report evidence showing 
the Richmond and Hampton Roads metropolitan areas touching each 
other along the I-64 corridor and the Washington, D.C., and Richmond 
metropolitan areas approaching, if not touching, each other. Given 
this likelihood, it would be silly not to give thought to what such a 
megaregion should look like in terms of its governance.  
2017 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT
148 TIME TO GO REGIONAL OR MEGA?■
TABLE 3
 OUT-OF-METRO COMMUTING PATTERNS: RICHMOND AND HAMPTON ROADS, 2014
Top 10 Out-of-Metro Places To Which Workers Commute Out-of-Region
Richmond Metro Hampton Roads Metro
                                Number of Workers Number of Workers
Fairfax County 15,463 Fairfax County 12,647
Virginia Beach 5,942 Henrico County 11,128
Prince William County 4,222 Richmond 7,514
Newport News 4,085 Chesterfield County  5,879
Norfolk 4,022 Arlington County 3,814
Spotsylvania County 3,697 Prince William County 3,263
Chesapeake 3,618 Loudoun County 2,753
Loudoun County 3,265 Hanover County 2,486
James City County 3,167 Alexandria 1,896
Arlington County 2,832 Stafford County 1,430
Top 10 Out-of-Metro Places From Which Workers Come
Richmond Metro Hampton Roads Metro
Fairfax County 8,592 Chesterfield County 6,668
Virginia Beach 7,504 Fairfax County 5,842
Prince William County 5,873 Henrico County 5,581
Loudoun County 4,639 Prince William County 4,348
Newport News 4,212 Currituck County, NC 3,910
Norfolk 4,059 Richmond 3,667
Chesapeake 3,780 Loudoun County 2,720
Spotsylvania County 3,356 Middlesex County 2,689
Hampton 3,040 Pasquotank County, NC 2,505
Albemarle County 2,357 Accomack County 2,450
Source: Virginia Employment Commission Origin-Destination Statistics, 2014
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TABLE 4
CHARACTERISTICS OF A MID-ATLANTIC MEGAREGION: BALTIMORE TO HAMPTON ROADS, 2016
Gross Regional Product (GRP) Population (Estimate)
Baltimore $187,395,000,000 2,798,886
Hampton Roads $92,827,000,000 1,726,907
Richmond $80,702,000,000 1,281,708
Washington, D.C. $509,224,000,000 6,131,977
Totals $870,148,000,000 11,939,478
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau for population and Bureau of Economic Analysis for GRP
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GRAPH 1
GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCTS OF THE LARGEST METROPOLITAN REGIONS 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND A VIRGINIA URBAN CRESCENT MEGAREGION, 2015
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Can We Learn From Others?
Aside from New York City, three outstanding examples of regional 
government in the United States are Portland, Minneapolis-St. Paul and 
Indianapolis. We will discuss each briefly to give readers what could well 
be a taste of the future.
PORTLAND
Portland is the country’s only MSA to have gone as far as establishing 
a general-purpose, regionally elected governing body. “Metro,” as this 
elected government is known, serves more than 1.5 million people in 
a metropolitan area with a population of almost 2.4 million. Metro 
encompasses the city of Portland and 23 other cities. The cities and 
counties maintain their own local governments, but Metro provides 
regionwide planning and coordination to manage growth, infrastructure 
and development issues that cross jurisdictional boundaries. It does 
the transportation planning; manages 17,000 acres of parks, trails and 
natural areas; and operates attractions such as the Oregon Zoo, Oregon 
Convention Center, Portland Expo Center and Portland Center for 
the Arts. It plans and oversees the region’s solid waste and recycling 
programs.  
Portland is a medium-sized city – the nation’s 25th-largest metro area in 
terms of population. Oft-referenced publications such as “Places Rated”8 
consistently assign it high rankings, citing its regional transit system, 
the walkability of its urban areas and its environmental consciousness, in 
addition to conventional amenities and many attractive job opportunities. 
Portland provides evidence that regions can flourish with a regional 
government as an overlay to local governments.  
Even so, it should be noted that financial savings associated with 
Portland’s particular model of regional government have never really been 
documented. Indeed, given the notably progressive political bent of the city 
of Portland’s citizenry and leadership, regional government has turned out 
to be a vehicle for extending a high-tax, high-service model to a broader 
8  www.bestplaces.net.
range of cities and towns than otherwise probably would have been the 
case. 
MINNEAPOLIS AND ST. PAUL
The twin cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul are distinct governmental 
units in Minnesota. Minneapolis (population 407,000) is the county seat 
of Hennepin County, which includes 44 other cities. St. Paul (population 
297,000) is the county seat of Ramsey County. Together, the two cities 
usually are referred to as the Twin Cities – hence the name of their major 
league baseball team, the Minnesota Twins. The metropolitan region 
includes seven counties as well, and the metropolitan area population 
exceeds 3.28 million.  
St. Paul maintains a unique neighborhood governance system whereby it is 
divided into 17 city districts, each of which has a council funded by the city, 
and exercises significant powers, especially on land-use issues. The overlay 
of the regional government structure of the Twin Cities metropolitan 
area is an almost 50-year-old Metropolitan Council whose members are 
appointed by the governor. The council deals with the region’s public 
transportation, sewage treatment, regional and urban planning, housing, 
and parks and trails. The enabling state legislation provides that the 
Metropolitan Council shall “provide a framework for regional systems 
including aviation, transportation, parks and open spaces, water quality 
and water management.”9 The Metropolitan Council boasts that it offers 
a variety of public services at lower-unit costs than comparable cities, and 
there is some evidence in favor of this view.  
INDIANAPOLIS 
Indianapolis (population 858,000, but almost 2 million in the metropolitan 
area) has a complex form of governance known as “Unigov” that came 
about in 1970 when the city consolidated with the government of Marion 
County and 11 towns. While local governments maintain some of their 
own municipal services and identities, including police and schools, Unigov 
provides consolidated services not unlike Portland and the Twin Cities.  
9  https://metrocouncil.org.
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The Indianapolis experience is unique in that it has been the subject of a 
comprehensive study and evaluation: “40 Years after Unigov: Indianapolis 
and Marion County’s Experience with Consolidated Government” (Jeff 
Wachter, May 2014, Center for Government Research, www.cgr.org). 
Wachter concluded that “Unigov-impacted communities in Indianapolis 
are in a better position going forward – the economy is stronger, the tax 
base is broader, and the city’s reputation is greater.” Noting that some 
of the initial impact of Unigov may be declining, Wachter makes the 
important point that “the benefit of consolidation might not have been 
dependent on unified government as much as on a unified vision for the 
region’s future.”  
Final Observations
The experience of Indianapolis underlines an important point: Cities and 
counties do not need to establish formal regional governmental structures 
to cooperate. More important are the attitudes of the participants and 
their willingness to collaborate. 
Given the rapid pace of urbanization along the mid-Atlantic coast and the 
likely continued growth of the federal government, it is easy to forecast 
that in 25 years, Virginia’s urban crescent will constitute a continuous 
band of population and economic activity with no rural interruptions. 
A salient question is how this urban swath should be governed. Some 
regional and multiregional governmental solutions surely must be 
considered. Portland, the Twin Cities and Indianapolis provide some 
guidance in this regard.
Aside from natural tensions between localities arising from regional 
consolidation and political motivations, Virginia’s almost notorious 
status as a Dillon Rule state may prove to be the largest barrier to 
regionalization. Insofar as municipal sovereignty is concerned, compared 
to states across the country, localities within Virginia are significantly 
disadvantaged due to the Commonwealth’s long history of Dillon Rule 
jurisprudence and, perhaps most relevant to this discussion, the denial of 
several local governmental consolidations throughout the 20th century. In 
light of the fact that Indianapolis, the Twin Cities and Portland are not 
strictly subject to the same red tape as municipalities in Virginia, it would 
seem that any attempt at regionalization in the Commonwealth would 
necessitate one of two things: an imaginative solution similar to Unigov, 
where towns can consolidate services creatively while still maintaining 
enough separation to circumvent the Dillon Rule, or at minimum a 
reduction in how broadly Virginia applies the Dillon Rule to certain 
aspects of municipal sovereignty. 
If notable Virginians such as Mr. Jefferson were in residence today, 
would they insist that Virginia governmental laws, structures and 
traditions, some of which date to before the American Revolution, 
be maintained, regardless of their relevance to today’s challenges 
or their cost effectiveness? We venture this observation: If these 
revered individuals were as astute and perceptive as history 
records, then transplanted to 2017, they would be supporters and 
advocates of innovative regional governance structures. They would 
wish to maintain local contact and control wherever plausible, 
but simultaneously encourage and implement regional solutions to 
challenges that no longer respect city and county boundaries.     
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APPENDIX A
SUCCESSFUL CONSOLIDATIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN VIRGINIA
Units of Government Involved Name of Consolidated Government Merger Effective Date
Richmond (city) Manchester (city) City of Richmond 1910
Waynesboro (town) Basic City (town) Town of Waynesboro 1923
Hampton (city) Phoebus (town) Elizabeth City (county) City of Hampton 1952
Newport News (city) Warwick (county) City of Newport News 1958
Virginia Beach (city) Princess Anne (county) City of Virginia Beach 1963
South Norfolk (city) Norfolk (county) City of Chesapeake 1963
Tazewell (town) North Tazewell (town) Town of Tazewell 1963
Christiansburg (town) Cambria (town) Town of Christiansburg 1964
Holland (town) Whaleyville (town) Nansemond (county) City of Nansemond 1972
Suffolk (city) Nansemond (city) City of Suffolk 1974
DEFEATED CONSOLIDATIONS
Units of Government Involved Proposed Name of Consolidated Government Year of Rejection
Hampton (city) Newport News (city) Warwick (city) City of Hampton Roads 1956
Richmond (city) Henrico (county) City of Richmond 1961
Winchester (city) Frederick (county) City of Winchester 1969
Roanoke (city) Roanoke (county) Name of city to be determined by voters. 1969
Charlottesville (city) Albemarle (county) Name of city to be determined by voters. 1970
Bristol (city) Washington (county) Name of city to be determined by voters. 1971
Front Royal (town) Warren (county) Front Royal - city or county form to be determined by voters. 1976
Pulaski (town) Dublin (town) Pulaski (county) County of Pulaski 1983
Staunton (city) Augusta (county) Consolidated County of Augusta and Tier City of Staunton 1984
Covington (city) Clifton Forge (city) Alleghany (county) City of Alleghany Highlands 1987
Emporia (city) Greensville (county) City of Emporia 1987
Roanoke (city) Roanoke (county) Roanoke Metropolitan Government 1990
Clifton Forge (city) Alleghany (county) City of Alleghany 1991
Bedford (city) Bedford (county) City of Bedford and Shire of Bedford 1995
Source: Virginia Commission on Local Government
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